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Preface
Le chercheur en science humaine jouit d’une re´putation de solitaire compare´ a`
son colle`gue de science exacte. Et pourtant, derrie`re des articles signe´s par un
ou deux auteurs, se cachent une myriade de petites et grande collaborations. En
particulier, cette the`se est le re´sultat non seulement de collaborations formelles
avec deux co-auteurs, Vincent Vandenberghe et Mathias Hungerbu¨hler, mais
aussi de nombreuses collaborations plus ou moins formelles, de soutien, de
coups de pouce, d’aide ponctuelle (e´ventuellement re´currente), d’inspiration
venant de nombreuses autres personnes, a` Namur et ailleurs. En premier lieu,
le roˆle de promoteur a beau eˆtre formalise´ sur papier, dans les faits il existe
autant de surpervisions que de promoteurs. Ainsi mon promoteur, Alain de
Crombrugghe, a e´te´ une pierre angulaire de ce travail de the`se tout en sachant
me laisser une grande liberte´ de recherche, si che`re aux acade´miques. C’est sur
base d’une proposition de me´moire de sa part, portant sur les re´cessions dite en
W , ou double dip, qu’est ne´e la recherche qui a servi de base a` la re´daction d’un
projet finance´ par le FNRS et au premier chapitre de cette the`se. Malgre´ que
mes recherches aient pris une direction autre, plus labour et moins finance, il est
reste´ enthousiaste et preˆt a` discuter des re´sultats quels qu’ils soient, apportant
son soutien a` toutes mes initiatives. En dehors de la recherche, il m’a aussi
donne´ l’occasion de faire mes armes dans l’enseignement en partageant avec
moi la responsabilite´ de mener a` bien le projet de classe inverse´e pour le cours
d’introduction a` l’e´conomie.
Ma recherche a aussi certainement be´ne´ficie´ des conseils avise´s de mon jury
dont je remercie chacun des membres, a` commencer par le pre´sident Jean-
Marie Baland, Gre´gory de Walque, Ce´line Poilly et mes deux co-auteurs sus-
mentionne´s. Au quotidien, ce sont surtout mes colle`gues qui ont e´te´ d’un sou-
tien sans faille, toujours preˆts aussi a` ce´le´brer une bonne nouvelle ou partager
un gaˆteau. D’abord ceux (et surtout celles) avec qui j’ai eu la chancer de
partager mon bureau: Isabelle, Anders, Marie-Sophie et Camille. Ensuite ceux
et celles qui ont fait avant moi la de´monstration qu’il existe autant de manie`res
de faire une the`se que de doctorants: Ombeline, Elias, Isabelle, Joaquin,
Alexandre, Franc¸ois, Wouter, Giulia, Elena, Nicolas, Astrid, Kelbesa, Jolan,
He´le`ne, Olivier et Je´re´mie. Ceux aussi qui m’ont rappele´ que faire une the`se
e´tait un choix parmi d’autres: Matteo, Caroline, Charlotte, Mathieu, Marie-
Sophie. Ceux finalement qui ont suivi de pre`s les hauts et les bas inhe´rents aux
derniers mois de the`se: Camille, Modeste, Henri, Joey, Ludovic, Ste´phanie,
Rinchan et les derniers arrive´s Marie, Pierre, Auguste, Luca et Paola ainsi
que mes re´cents colle`gues ne´o-louvanistes. Une pense´e partculie`re pour ceux
qui souffrirent avec moi des de´boires quotidiens de la SNCB. Un merci parti-
culier a` Pierrette pour sa disponibilite´, son calme, et sa capacite´ a` re´pondre
inlassablement aux questions en tout genre quant au fameux parcours doctoral.
Enfin un gros kusje a` mon entourage. Mes parents pour leur compre´hension
des me´andres de l’universite´. Mes beaux-parents pour leur inlassables ten-
tatives de comprendre en quoi consiste mon job. Et tout particulie`rement
Robin qui y a toujours cru plus que moi, qui a mis la main a` la paˆte, ou plus
pre´cise´ment au code, a` de multiples reprises et qui fait mine de comprendre
que l’he´te´rosce´dasticite´ et la non-stationnarite´ soient a` meˆme de ge´ne´rer des
nuits sans sommeil.
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Chapter 1
Jobless recoveries after
financial crises (and the key
role of the extensive margin
of employment)
Using a dynamic panel of 15 developed countries over the 1960-2010
period, this paper compares employment and hours recovery paths
after financial vs. non-financial crises. We show that post financial
crises recoveries display a stronger uplift of individual hours and
a weaker one of the employment rate. The results are robust to
controlling for the strength of the recovery in terms of GDP growth
per capita, the depth of the preceeding recession, labour-market
institutions differences potentially correlated with financial vs non-
financial crises and for dynamic panel bias. In conclusion, we argue
that considering both margins of employment, in particular the role
of extended hours in coping with rising output, improves our un-
derstanding of financial crises as a source of jobless recoveries.
Keywords: Financial crises, jobless recoveries, employment, work-
ing time.
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1.1 Introduction
Bad news regarding employment have received large and continuous media
coverage ever since the recent recession episodes of 2008 and 2012. Reports of
sluggish employment growth kept coming even when gross domestic product
and other indicators, such as investments, displayed signs of recovery. This
phenomenon where an economy GDP experiences growth while maintaining
or decreasing its level of employment has been coined “jobless recovery” in
the literature since it was first documented in the US the early 1990’s. A
jobless recovery is usually defined as a recovery displaying a slower growth of
employment than would be predicted by historical data. Specifically, during
jobless recoveries, the growth of the employment rate is delayed with respect
to the growth of GDP, beyond the mere lag attributable to frictions on the
labour market.
Economists still debate to determine whether (and why) recoveries in the US
are more prone to joblessness than in the past (Graetz & Michaels, 2017). What
motivates this paper is that there is international evidence of large variability
in the paths of employment recovery after recession episodes. For example,
Figure 1.1 presents the recovery path (growth rate since the trough) of the
employment rate (share of people who declare holding a job among the 16-64
population) after each recession episode in the period from 1960 to 2010 for
the US, Germany and Sweden. While some recoveries display a strong rebound
of the employment rate, in other cases it keeps plummeting for many quarters
after the GDP starts picking up. In this paper, the timing of the economic
cycle always refers to the GDP growth rate per capita: peaks and troughs refer
to the GDP such that the term “recovery” always refers to the period after the
trough and before the next peak and the term “recession” refers to the period
from after the peak until the through.
The determinants of the path of recovery of the employment rate have been
studied by a broad literature in the past. In particular, the role of financial
crises in determining the speed of recovery of employment relative to GDP has
attracted a lot of attention. While some authors conclude that financial crises
negatively impact the growth of employment, other reach the opposite conclu-
sion. For instance, the direct dependance of employment on credit through
the cost of opening a vacancy or the need for working capital is documented
14
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by Boustanifar (2014), Pagano & Pica (2012), Dromel et al. (2010), Wasmer
& Weil (2004)). Amplification of labour market variations by agency costs on
credit markets are documented by Petrosky-Nadeau (2014)) and the absence
of collateral on employment is the cornerstone in Calvo et al.(2012). All these
studies conclude to a negative impact of financial frictions on employment. On
the opposite, Gali, Smets and Wouters (2007) conclude that financial crises do
not cause total hours (the sum of individual hours) to grow significantly more
slowly. They show that in the United States, total hours worked do not behave
differently accross recoveries taking the usual control variables into account,
especially output growth.
It can be noticed that all papers concluding that financial crises signficantly
impact employment use an extensive margin definition (jobs created), whereas
Gali, Smets and Wouters, who obtain opposite conclusions, use the total num-
ber of hours worked. The contribution of this paper is to study both margins
in parallel. The option taken in this research is to simultaneoulsy explore the
employment rate and the individual hours of work. The database of Ohanian
and Raffo is well suited to this approach, as it comprises two separately esti-
mated series for the employment rate and for individual hours of work (total
hours worked are also available in their dataset and are computed by combining
both the employment rate and individual hours). Importantly, the measure of
individual hours is based on surveys and therefore allows to capture unpaid
overtime. We suspect that financial crises do not impact the extensive and in
the intensive margin of labour in the same way. In particular, we expect reces-
sions caused by financial crises to translate into a lower propensity of firms to
recruit and an overall tendency to raise hours. For instance, looking at two re-
cessions taken in our dataset, we present in Figure 1.2 the recovery path of both
the employment rate and individual hours for the USA in 1973 and Sweden in
1990. The relatively weak job recovery appears to be stronlgy compensated by
a strong recovery in individual hours.
A careful disctinction between the behaviour of the employment rate of the
labour force (extensive margin) and the behaviour of the individual hours of the
workers (intensive margin) in a recovery generates two types of consequences.
First, the existence of different types of recoveries has important welfare and
policy implications for workers. Divergences in hours and employment across
recoveries and across countries are likely to affect the distribution of income
and as well as the activation of unemployment benefits and other social ex-
16
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Figure 1.2: Joblessness in the data: growth rate of the employment rate and
of individual hours of work in the quarters following the through,
normalized to 0 at the through, for recession episodes in the USA-
1973 and Sweden-1990.
penditure schemes. Second, empirically, this distinction creates room for a
better understanding of the relation between output growth and labour in-
puts. Showing how hours diverge from employment helps solve the paradox of
labour productivity differentials observed across recoveries. Previously, work by
Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) and Berger (2012) pointed to productivity-enhancing
restructuring during recoveries. Jobless recoveries, they point out, tend to dis-
play a higher level of productivity per worker. They argue that this is due to
the less capable workers being fired, the less productive plants closing, or a
higher productivity level needed to launch a new business. These mechanisms
are able to explain (and link) the higher productivity and lower employment
rate observed together in some jobless recoveries. We argue that besides those
previously highlighted mechanisms, it could also be the case that more hours
per worker, that can at least partially consist in unpaid overtime, raise the
observed productivity per worker and at the same time generate joblessness,
as more individual hours substitute in for hiring new workers. Evidences of
a stronger individual effort during bad times have been measured at the firm
17
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level by Lazear et al. (2016). As our series on individual working time is based
on surveys, we are confident that it will capture unpaid overtime that can be
considered as effort put on by the worker to avoid loosing their job. Our mea-
sure of the intensive margin (individual hours of work) thus captures parlty
worker-level productivity. We are also convinced that in the quarters following
the trough of GDP, high unemployment rates maintain the incentive needed
for the extra effort. In fact, during recoveries that display high unemployment
and low job creation, the incentives to put on extra effort to avoid loosing one’s
job, as in Lazear’s story, are still very high.
This paper thus adresses the question of whether financial crises are a sig-
nificant determinant of the recovery of the employment rate and in parallel
whether they have a similar impact on individual hours of work. Let us there-
fore call recoveries following financial crises “jobless” if they display a weaker
growth of the employment rate than recoveries following non-financial crises.
Specifically, this paper uses the comparison between financial and non-financial
crises to assess the hypothesis that financial constraints, during the early stages
of a recovery may lead firms to favour longer hours over recruitment; and thus
explain why financial crises are followed by jobless recoveries. Obviously, finan-
cial crises are different from non-financial crises regarding many other aspects
than the employment rate and individual hours of work. We develop different
strategies to control for all other aspects of the economy (length, size and other
characteristics of the recession, timing, strength and other characteristics of the
recovery and structural characteristics (labour market institutions, . . . ) of the
economy). We present what we believe is a new stylized fact regarding jobless
recoveries and financial crises: while we confirm previous findings that finan-
cial crises tend to delay the rebound of the employment rate, we also find that
individual hours of work tend to grow at a stronger pace following financial
crises. This new stylized fact is based on all economic cycles observed in 15
developed countries from 1960 to 2010.
The paper is then organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the dataset.
It describes the length and size of GDP cycles, the employment and hours
data of Ohanian and Raffo (2012), financial vs. non-financial crises (relying on
the data and classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and of Laeven and
Valencia (2012)) and other determinants of labour market outcomes. Section
1.3 explains the empirical strategy, a dynamic panel estimation that takes into
account the timing of the events within the cycle. Section 1.4 presents the
18
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estimation results of the behaviours of employment rate and individual hours
of work during 140 episodes of economic recovery experienced by 15 advanced
economies between 1960 and 2010. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
Cycles and GDP The evidence presented in this paper is based on quarterly
time series for 15 countries1 over 50 years (1960 to 2010) leading to a total
of 2462 observations (the dataset is mainly restricted by the availability of
harmonized hours of work series) constituting 140 distinct cycles. Each cycle
is made of a recession (or contraction) and of a recovery period that will form
the focal point of this paper. For simplicity of exposure, we always refer to
the period between peak and through as “the recession”, even when the GDP
growth rate only slows down and generates a mere “contraction” instead of
a true “recession”. Among the 140 cycles, 63 display a true recession (GDP
(per capita) decreases from peak to trough) and 77 display a contraction (GDP
(per capita) grows at a slower rate). Summary statistics on cycles are given in
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 where the recession’s length counts the number of quarters
from peak to trough and the recession’s depth measures the growth rate of
GDP from peak to trough. Peaks and throughs dates are extracted from the
cycle dating series of the OECD.
mean sd min max
Annual individual hours worked 1,876 290.5 1,314 2,845
Employment rate 63.53 15.33 55.6 83.11
GDP per capita peak to trough growth rate (recession size) 0.469 4.761 -14.54 23.01
Number of quarter from peak to trough (recession length) 7.828 3.905 2 19
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics over all observations.
1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2000-2005’s 2006-2010’s
Average recession depth 6% 1% 0.9% 0.6% 2,3% -3%
Table 1.2: Average recession depth (peak to trough growth
rate of GDP per capita) over time
1Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA
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Employment and hours The employment rate measures the share of em-
ployed people (headcount of people reporting having worked during the quarter)
among the population aged 16 to 64. As mentioned, the dataset uses the quar-
terly hours worked per worker series from the Ohanian and Raffo database.
The hours worked series is composed of the number of hours worked by indi-
vidual worker as reported in surveys and harmonized over time and countries
for the period 1960-2010. It takes into account the number of days that are
not worked (offical holidays, ...). The level of hours worked individually varies
over time with a decreasing long-term trend but it especially varies a lot across
countries, from an all-period average around 1500 annual hours in Norway and
Sweden to above 2200 in Ireland, Japan and Korea. The rest of the data are
standard country time series extracted from the OECD database and Bassanini
& Duval (2009) database on labour market institutions as well as labour mar-
ket characteristics data from the ICTWSS2 that ranks countries each year on
a scale from 1 (no wage coordination) to 5 (fully centralized wage-setting). All
levels of wage coordination are well represented in the database as can be seen
in Table 1.3. This measure of wage coordination will be our preferred control
measure for labour market institutions. To our knowledge, other, more often
used, measures of labour market institutions do not cover the whole period of
interest in this paper3 or do not vary overtime within some countries4.
Wage coordination: level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 level 5
Share of all observations 17% 12% 22% 30% 20%
Table 1.3: Distribution observations regarding wage coor-
dination
Financial crises They play a key role in our research. We use the fact that
the observed recovery episode follows a financial crisis to infer the presence of
financial restrictions affecting firms’ men-hours tradeoff. We rely on the iden-
tification of financial crises made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) who identify
29 financial crises in our sample and define a financial crisis as:
“Bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the
2database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Interven-
tion and Social Pacts, 1960-2011
3For example the employment protection indicator (EPI) of the OECD starts in 1980/
4For example the strength of wage coordination from the ICTWSS does not vary overtime
in some countries of our sample
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pulic sector of one or more financial institutions; and if there are
no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-scale governement
assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institu-
tions), that mark the start of a string of similar outcomes for other
financial institutions.” (Reinhart & Rogoff (2009))
As a robustness check, we will use the alternative definition of financial crises by
Laeven and Valencia (2012) who define financial crises as follows: “A banking
crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are met: 1) Significant signs of
financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs,
losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) 2) Significant banking
policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking
system”. The main difference with the definition by Reinhart and Rogoff is the
necessary public intervention. As expected following many previous studies,
the average output fall (measured as the sum of quarterly growth rate of GDP
per capita from peak to trough) is higher in financial crises (-4,6%) than in
non-financial crises (-2,56%). The length of crises (number of quarters from
peak to trough) is not very different in financial crises and non-financial crises
(6,15 versus 6,33 quarters). Also, financial recessions display significantly larger
decline in the employment rate (in coherence with Calvo et al ’s (2012) results
regarding the unemployment rate)5. However, the presence of a financial cri-
sis during the recession makes no strong difference for hours worked. More
precisely, hours worked per worker are globally not strongly affected during
recessions, even though this apparent absence of variation is an average and
could hide large differences between jobs or sectors, with some workers reducing
their paid hours and other working unpaid overtime for example. The dataset
available does not allow to identify heterogeneity among workers.
Figure 1.3 shows the average recovery path, with and without financial crisis,
of both the employment rate and the number of hours worked per worker over
the years following a trough (in t = 0, all cumulative growth rate are thus
equal to zero). The graphs correpond to an average, over all countries and
cycles, of the recovery paths presented in Figure 1.1 and 1.2. The detailed
computation methodology is presented in the next section. It clearly appears
in Figure 1.3 that in the presence of a financial crisis, the employment rate is
5Calvo et al., and other studies, often look at the unemployment rate. We prefer employ-
ment to unemployment measures because it carries more information, especially in the cases
where discouraged job-seekers drop from unemployment statistics or when students defer
their entry on the labour market waiting for more favourable conditions.
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recovering more weakly and the opposite is true for hours worked per worker.
The objective of the paper is to assess econometrically the magnitude and the
statistical significativity of the difference on display on Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Average cumulative growth of employment rate and hours worked
growth following the trough.
1.3 Empirical strategy
The objective is to determine, using non-financial crises as a reference, whether
financial crises significantly affects the growth rate of the employment rate
(and/or the growth rate of individual hours) during the recovery, that is to say
in the period directly following a trough. At this point, it should be noted that
three different time dimensions interfere with each other. First, an observation
in our country-level panel data correspond to a country (c) and a quarter (t).
For example, t = 1980 − 1 means that the observation was made during the
first quarter of the year 1980. This first time dimension is thus an absolute one.
The second time dimension, r, is relative: each observation belongs to one, and
only one, cycle and we can measure the number of quarters, r, elapsed since the
trough. For example, an observation that lies two quarters before the trough
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(during the recession phase thus) will have r = −2 and an observation lying 4
quarters after the trough will have r = 4. Each observation is thus associated
to a unique value pair of values t and r. Finally, the third dimension (q) is the
horizon over which the growth rate is computed. For example, it is possible to
compute the growth rate of the employment rate over one quarter, generating
the quarter-on-quarter growth rate. It is also possible to compute the growth
rate over, for example, four quarters, which yields the year-on-year growth
rate. For each unique observation, measured in t and located r quarters after
the trough, we compute the cumulative growth since t − q. We do so over 16
different time horizons q, generating 16 new variables. For one of these we
have the specific case where r = q, for example if an observation t is located 5
quarters after the trough (r = 5), then when q = 5, we compute precisely the
cumulative growth rate since the trough. For the needs of the estimation of the
model, we build a (dummy) variable Q that relates the horizon over which the
growth rate is computed to the number of quarters elapsed since the trough.
Formally, Qqt = 0 if r 6= q, Qqt = 1 if r = q; q = 1, . . . .16.
The first step is thus to compute the cumulative growth rate of the variable
of interest for horizons q, ranging from 1 to 16 quarters, for our two variables of
interest, the employment rate and individual hours worked, denoted E and H.
Ignoring the country dimension, the cumulative growth rate of the employment
rate over the last q quarters at any time t is then given by ∆Et,q =
Et−Et−q
Et−q
.
Similarly, the cumulative growth rate of individual hours over the last q quarters
at any time t is given by ∆Ht,q =
Ht−Ht−q
Ht−q
. We compute these variables ∆Et,q
and ∆Ht,q for q going from 1 to 16, for all t (quarters from 1960 tp 2010).
We then apply a methodology borrowed from local projection methods (Jorda`,
2005). The objective is to have a separate regression for each time horizon (q)
over which we compute the growth rate. Local projections represent an now
well-established alternative to VARs in empirical macroeconomic research. One
of their great strengths is that they can be estimated by simple regression tech-
niques and, what is more, that they impose almost no restrictions on the data
due to a very flexible specification that consists of a series of dummies. We can
then easily allow financial crises to have a different impact at different points in
the recovery. The advantage of local projections over VARs is best understood
by reading the words of Jorda`:
“The central idea consists in estimating local projections at each
period of interest rather than extrapolating into increasingly distant
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horizons from a given model, as it is done with vector autoregres-
sions (VAR)”. (Jorda`, 2005)6
The consequence of using local projections instead of a single VAR is that we
will have as many regressions as the number of horizons considered (horizons
q over which we compute the growth rate of the employment rate and of the
indvidual hours of work). In each regression, q is fixed to a value comprised
between 1 and 16. The estimated models are the following, for the employment
rate first, for {q = 1, 2, ...16}:
Et,c − Et−q,c
Et−q,c
= ∆Et,q,c = λ
q
A(financial crisis dummy)t,c (A)
+ λqB(dummy Q
q
t,c equal to 1 if q=r)t,c (B)
+ λqAB [(A) ∗ (B)]
+ λqCEt−q,c
+ λqD(GDP growth over the last q quarters)t−2,c
+ λqE(level of wage coordination)t,c
+ λqF−J(dummies: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2006 )t,c
+ constantq
+ uqc(country fixed effect) + 
q
c,t (1.1)
And then similarly for individual hours of work, for {q = 1, 2, ...16}:
6The equivalence between Local Projects (LP) and VARs is presented by Plagborg-Moller
and Wolf (2019). In the case of infinite lags, any VAR can be re-written as a LP by using the
appropriate control variables and any LP model can be written in the form of a VAR with the
appropriate variable ordering. In cases whitout infinite lags, no method is proved to dominate
the other under all circumstances and the choice of method amounts to a bias/variance
arbitrage.
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Ht,c −Ht−q,c
Ht−q,c
= ∆Ht,q,c = µ
q
A(financial crisis dummy)t,c (A)
+ µqB(dummy Q
q
t,c= 1 if q=r)t,c (B)
+ µqAB [(A) ∗ (B)]
+ µqCHt−q,c
+ µqD(GDP growth over the last q quarters)t−2,c
+ µqE(level of wage coordination)t,c
+ µqF−J(dummies: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2006 )t,c
+ constantq
+ uqc(country fixed effect) + 
q
c,t (1.2)
Note that, in what follows, the above equations are estimated using only
recovery quarters. Coefficients λqA and µ
q
A measure the average outcome dif-
ference between financial vs non-financial crisis at any time of the recovery7.
In fact, the dummy (financial crisis)t,c accounts for the presence of a financial
crisis during the observed cycle. This financial crisis variable refers to the defi-
nition made by Reinhart and Rogoff and is equal to one if at least one quarter
during the cycle is reported as a financial crisis episode. Coefficients λqB and
µqB measure how much, in the case of a non-financial crisis, being q quarters
after the trough makes a difference in terms of employment/hours compare to
the other quarters of the recovery. Precisely, Qqt,c is equal to 1 when q = r, that
is to say when the time horizon considered for computing the growth rate (ie
the dependent variable), q, is equal to the time elapsed since the last trough,
r. For example, in the regression where q = 3, the dummy (Qqt,c) is worth 1
for observations that lie exactly 3 quarters after the trough. In other words,
observations associated to a value r = 3. Within each cycle, there is only one
observation such that q = r. If we would only keep those observations for
the regression analysis, the dummy (B) would always be equal to 1 and we
would fall back to an event-study methodology. The results of running such an
event study are presented as a robustness check in the appendix.8 In such an
event-study design, we loose many observations, reducing the precision of the
7except the quarter that is exactly q quarters after the trough
8Figure 1.3 is based on this event study methodology where we only keep the observations
such that q = r. In other words, to compute the average growth rate of employment (resp.
hours) 1(q) quarters after the trough, we only keep the observations that lie 1(r) quarter(s)
after the trough. Technically, the difference between the two curves graphed in Figure 1.3 is
thus measured in the event-study model.
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estimates.
Coefficients λqAB and µ
q
AB measure how much, in the case of a financial
crisis, being q quarters after the trough makes a difference in terms of em-
ployment/hours compare to the other quarters of the (post-financial crisis)
recovery. For example, in the regression where q is fixed to 4, the coefficients
λqAB and µ
q
AB measure the extent to which being 1 year after the trough makes
a difference in terms of the degree of employment/hours recovery.
Our list of controls comprises: the base level of the dependent variable (with
coefficients λqC and µ
q
C), the growth of GDP over the same horizon (with coef-
ficients λqD and µ
q
D), the level of wage coordination (with coefficients λ
q
E and
µqE), the decade (dummy per 10-year period, with coefficient λ
q
F to λ
q
J and µ
q
F
to µqJ ) and a country fixed effect (u
q
c).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Employment
Table 1.4 first line (λqA), contains our estimates of the propensity of post-
financial crises episodes to generate employment responses that deviate from
those characterising standards recoveries. As exposed above, each column cor-
respond to a different time horizon (of q quarters). We can see a very significant
negative impact of the presence of a financial crisis during the cycle on the em-
ployment growth even after the growth of GDP, country fixed effects and the
level of employment rate9 are accounted for. In particular, the values presented
in Table 1.4 reads as follow: considering the cumulative growth of the employ-
ment rate over 4 quarters (column (4)), the employment recovery handicap
associated to financial crises is equal to 0.22 percentage point.
The second and third lines (λqB ; λ
q
AB) suggest that the precise quarter of
the recovery calendar (except perhaps the first one) does not matter. Also as
expected, the employment positively correlates with the growth of GDP (vari-
able “GDP growth L2” which measure the growth rate of GDP over the same
9As expected, the higher the employment already is, the lower the growth rate, this being
partly due to the way growth is computed, a two percentage point increase in employment
represent less growth in percentage if the employment rate is higher. It also related to the
intuition that the closer a country is to full employment, the less it can still increase its
employment rate.
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time horizon lagged two periods to mitigate the risk of reverse causality). In
other words, the stronger the recovery of GDP, the stronger the recovery of
employment. Variables measuring the labour market institutions also play an
important role, especially the level at which wages are bargained. The more
centralized the bargaining (high values of “coord”), the higher the employment
growth. Finally, after controlling for all the above, there also seem to be factors
that have increased employment growth over time compared to the 1960’s, as
all time-period dummies capture positive significant effects.
1.4.2 Individual Hours
Regarding hours worked (results in Table 1.5), a significantly positive impact
of a financial crisis is found on the growth of hours worked computed starting
at 4 quarters of cumulated growth (line 1). This efffect is reinforced when
considering longer growth horizons (q > 4) (line 5). Combined with those
visible on the first line of Table 4, these results support the view that the
intensive margin is used as a substitute to re-hiring during recoveries following
financial crises. Turning to coefficient µqB and µ
q
AB , we find no evidence that
being exactly q quarters after the trough makes a differences at to the relative
intensity of the recovery of hours. As for the employment rate, the higher
the number of hours worked already is, the lower the growth rate of hours
worked, probably both for computational and human capacity reasons. The
GDP growth positively correlates to hours worked as expected.
Like with employment (Table 1.4), the wage coordination coefficient (µqE) is
statistically significant. But is has the opposite sign, suggesting that the more
wage bargaining is centralized, the lower is the growth of hours per worker.
These results are supportive of the idea that centralized wage bargaining might
be a good thing for employment growth during recoveries.
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1.4.3 Additional results and robustness analysis
First, we can detail the results obtained regarding the labour market institu-
tions control variable. As exposed above, we find that a higher degree of cen-
tralizatio of the wage setting correlates to a stronger employment rate growth
as well as a weaker growth of individual hours. Labour-market variables thus
appear to play a key role in avoiding ascribing to financial crises an impact
that has to do with labour-market institutions.
We then performed a series of robustness checks. First, we use an alternative
definition of financial crises, using Laeven and Valencia database. The main
difference with the database of Reinhart and Rogoff is that Laeven and Valencia
require public intervention to define a financial crisis. This results in slightly
less observations of financial crises. Results are presented in Table 1.6 and 1.7.
Second, we control for the size of the preceeding recession by using the (neg-
ative) growth of GDP per capital from peak to trough as well as this measure
squared, to capture potential particularities of deep recessions. Results are
presented in Tables 1.8 and 1.9. We find that deeper recessions, associated
with a larger fall of GDP per capita, tend to generate less employment rate
growth and stronger growth of individual hours. This effect is non-linear, as is
captured by the squared term, meaning that very deep recession are associated
with even less employment rate growth and even more individual hours growth.
Nevertheless, we still find that financial crises (that tend to be associated with
deeper recessions) still impacts negatively (resp. positively) the growth of the
employment rate (respec. of individual hours), even if this impact is only visi-
ble for growth rate computed over longer horizons. We also present evidences
of what happens to the employment rate growth and individual hours growth
during the recession. We find that a financial crise depresses both growth rates,
as does the fall in GDP (Tables 1.21 and 1.22).
Third, we present alternative control strategies for the GDP per capita. In
Tables 1.10 and 1.11, we present results when the GDP per capita growth rate,
used as a control variable, is not lagged. We also present, in Tables 1.12 and
1.13 the baseline model without the interact term.
Fourth, in Table 1.14, we present the results when using total hours of work
instead of individual hours. Total hours of work are computed by Ohanian and
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Raffo by simply multiplying individual hours by the number of workers. This
series is the closest to the dataset used by Gali, Smets and Wouters (2012).
We find contrasted results, with an average negative impact of financial crises
that is counteracted by a positive impact when measuring the growth rate
precisely since the trough, as is captured by the interaction term. The tentative
conclusion is that in the first year that follows the trough, the negative impact
of financial crises dominates, possibly because the low employment rate growth
effect dominates. From 6 to 8 quarters after the trough, we find that the
positive interaction term dominates, possibly indicating that the strong growth
of individual hours dominates the low growth of the employment rate.
Fifth, the only robustness test that generated important discrepancies was
to split the sample into 2 periods, before and after 1990. Our key results
hold with statistical significance only for the post 1990 period. It is however
the case that the period before 1990 was less prone to financial crises, such
that the lack of significant effect is most probably due to the low number of
observations displaying financial frictions in that period. Results are presented
in Tables 1.15 to 1.18.
Finally, we present the results from and event-study exercise where one keeps
only one observation per cycle (Tables 1.19 and 1.20). Precisely, we retain only
observations recorded exactly q quarters after the trough. As we do not exploit
the panel dimension of the data, we control for country fixed-effects using a
dummy per country, with a reference country. This allows to uncover country-
specific trend, mainly that the US, and more generally Anglosaxon countries,
tend to experience less joblessness. Their recovery period tend to be more on
the extensive margin (new jobs) than intensive (additional individual hours)
than european and asian countries.
1.4.4 Typical dynamic panel issues and stationarity
As equations (1.1) and (1.2) contain among their predictors the base level of
the dependant variable they can be said to be dynamic panel models. What is
more, they contain country fixed effects. In principle, we should thus consider
the possibility that our estimates are affected by the dynamic panel bias (also
know as the Nickell bias in the econometric literature). But, in our case, the
risk of a dynamic panel bias is greatly scaled down by the use of long time series
(large T ) as confirmed by Judson and Owen (1999) for the case of T > 30. In
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our case, all series cover at least 56 periods such that we are on the safe side
regarding dynamic panel bias10. It should also be noted that clustering of the
standard errors is not recommended for macro panels that typically do not
display a large enough number of individuals (here 15 countries).
In fact, dynamic panel with long time series are not plagued by the dynamic
panel bias but they may suffer from stationarity issues. In our case this issue is
greatly limited as the dependend variables are both always expressed in growth
rate. The only concern is with the independant variable controlling for the base
level of, respectively, the employment rate and the level of individual hours of
work. The employment rate is always comprised between 0 and 1 by definition,
and is stable of time. Individual hours of work display a decreasing trend over
time in all of the countries considered. Both series are stationary when taking
into account a drift in the fisher-type tests. As a matter of completeness we
present in the annexes the baseline regressions using linearly detrended series
(Tables 1.23 and 1.24).
1.5 Conclusion
The key results of this paper are essentially twofold. First, since 1960 and across
15 advanced economies, financial crisis tend to be be followed by recoveries
that are jobless. In comparison with recoveries taking place after non-financial
crises, they are significantly less prone to employment growth. Second, the
opposite results is found when focusing on the number of hours per worker.
During the quarters after financial crisis, hours per worker tend to grow more.
We posit that these results might be a confirmation of i) the key role of firm-
level credit constraints in the wake of financial/banking crises, but also ii) of
that of fixed labour costs in the way employers deal with the men vs. hours
tradeoff. If fixed labour costs are financed via credit, restricted access to the
10General case:
yit = αyi,t−1 + βxi,t + µi + vi,t
Where we have the following variables after fixed-effect transformation (within transforma-
tion) to remove unobserved µi:
y∗i,t−1 = yi,t−1 − y¯i
v∗i,t = vi,t − v¯i
Then the issues arises with the automatic correlation between v¯i and yi,t−1, where yi,t−1 is
also correlated to yi,t (presence of autocorrelation). However the correlation between v¯i and
yi,t−1 is greatly reduced by a large T .
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later should translate into less recruitment and extended hours of work.
Jobless recoveries have attracted a lot of interest from researchers in the past,
with the aim of uncovering the reasons employment would not follow the recov-
ery of the output, generating long-lasting, high unemployment levels. Different
studies found different reasons for jobless recoveries, among them demographic
changes (Stock & Watson (2012)) and lack of confidence in the sustainability of
the recovery (Schreft et al.(2005), Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2012)). Some pa-
pers insisted on the role of productive recessions, either due to sectoral shifts,
following the idea of Shumpeterian productive destruction (Jaimovich & Siu
(2012), Burger & Schwartz (2014) and Srivastava & Theodore (2005) among
others). Other papers focused on productivity-enhancing restructuring at the
firm level (mainly Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) and Berger (2012)). Our conclu-
sions are certainly in line with this last strand of the literature, as an increase
in individual hours will lead to an apparent increase in individual productivity,
measured in output per worker. This mechanism echoes most closely the lasting
increase in individual effort observed by Lazear (2013) at the plant level.
Our results also align with those of Gali, Smets and Wouters (2012) who find
no trace of joblessness in the US but use total hours of work as their measure
of employment. We show that this result is not incompatible with joblessness
in terms of the employment rate (the share of people who declare holding a
job among the 16-64 years old population). In particular, we show how, when
decomposing total hours of work into the intensive and the extensive margin
of labour, individual hours and the employment rate react with opposite sign
after a financial crisis.
In conclusion, our work highlights the importance of considering both the
extensive and the intensive margins of employment when studying employment.
In particular, what appears as just a jobless recovery might reveal a more
complex story once both margins of employment are taken into account.
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
Employment rate growth during the recession
(1)
VARIABLES peak to trough growth rate of the employment rate
fin crisis -0.986***
(0.109)
GDP during recession 0.392***
(0.0106)
GDP during recession, squared -0.0232***
(0.000758)
coord 0.253***
(0.0495)
Observations 2,896
R-squared 0.534
decade trend yes
base empl rate level yes
country FE yes
restrict to recoveries yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.21: Explaining the cumulative
growth of the employment
rate from peak to trough.
Hours worked growth during the recession
(1)
VARIABLES peak to trough growth rate of hours worked
fin crisis -0.219**
(0.0922)
GDP during recession 0.0314***
(0.00817)
GDP during recession, squared -0.00238***
(0.000563)
coord -0.172***
(0.0398)
Observations 2,473
R-squared 0.094
decade trend yes
base hour level yes
country FE yes
restrict to recoveries yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.22: Explaining the cumulative
growth of hours worked
per worker from peak to
trough.
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Jobless recoveries after financial crises (and the key role of the
extensive margin of employment)
H
ou
rs
w
o
rk
ed
gr
ow
th
ov
er
q
q
u
a
rt
er
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
1
q
u
ar
te
r
2
q
u
ar
te
rs
3
q
u
ar
te
rs
4
q
u
ar
te
rs
5
q
u
ar
te
rs
6
q
u
ar
te
rs
7
q
u
ar
te
rs
8
q
u
ar
te
rs
9
q
u
ar
te
rs
1
0
q
u
a
rt
er
s
1
1
q
u
ar
te
rs
1
2
q
u
a
rt
er
s
fi
n
cr
is
is
0.
25
1
0.
55
6
1.
64
6
3
.4
19
*
3.
21
6
*
3.
91
7*
4.
76
1
**
4.
67
5*
*
5
.6
61
*
*
5.
7
5
2*
*
4
.9
2
4*
5
.1
9
7*
*
(1
.4
97
)
(1
.5
11
)
(1
.6
33
)
(1
.8
62
)
(1
.9
07
)
(2
.0
51
)
(2
.1
81
)
(2
.3
00
)
(2
.3
21
)
(2
.4
4
1
)
(2
.5
3
0
)
(2
.5
9
2
)
G
D
P
=
L
,
0.
12
2
-0
.0
98
9
0
.5
2
8*
*
0.
78
6
**
*
0.
83
1*
**
0
.8
45
*
**
0.
83
9
**
*
0.
78
8*
**
0
.8
49
*
**
0.
8
4
4*
*
*
0.
8
12
*
**
0
.7
8
9*
*
*
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.3
08
)
(0
.2
44
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
65
)
(0
.1
6
5
)
(0
.1
6
2
)
(0
.1
5
7
)
co
or
d
-0
.5
36
-0
.8
69
-1
.4
7
0*
*
-1
.5
8
8*
*
-1
.8
3
4*
*
-2
.0
6
3*
*
-2
.5
3
0*
*
*
-2
.9
21
**
*
-3
.1
7
0*
**
-3
.3
1
3
**
*
-3
.1
9
5
**
*
-3
.5
93
*
**
(0
.6
01
)
(0
.6
06
)
(0
.6
54
)
(0
.7
44
)
(0
.7
63
)
(0
.8
20
)
(0
.8
75
)
(0
.9
24
)
(0
.9
33
)
(0
.9
9
2
)
(1
.0
3
6
)
(1
.0
6
9
)
1.
tr
ou
g
h
#
1
.fi
n
cr
is
is
cy
cl
e
-1
.0
69
-2
.1
96
1.
64
5
-2
.3
12
8.
96
5
*
1
2.
98
*
*
14
.6
5
**
13
.5
1
*
-0
.7
9
4
6.
10
7
-0
.8
3
7
-0
.2
3
4
(3
.8
33
)
(3
.8
51
)
(4
.1
60
)
(4
.7
57
)
(5
.0
70
)
(5
.6
21
)
(6
.5
76
)
(7
.1
90
)
(7
.6
17
)
(9
.3
8
4
)
(1
1
.1
5
)
(1
3
.1
7
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1,
39
4
1,
38
3
1
,3
7
2
1
,3
64
1,
3
57
1,
35
0
1,
34
3
1
,3
36
1
,3
27
1,
3
1
8
1
,3
1
0
1
,3
0
1
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
02
5
0.
04
5
0
.0
70
0
.0
90
0.
11
9
0.
14
3
0
.1
5
7
0
.1
78
0.
2
11
0
.2
3
1
0.
2
45
0
.2
6
5
d
ec
ad
e
tr
en
d
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
b
a
se
h
o
u
r
le
ve
l
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
co
u
n
tr
y
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
re
st
ri
ct
to
re
co
ve
ri
es
y
es
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5,
*
p
<
0.
1
T
ab
le
1.
24
:
E
x
p
la
in
in
g
th
e
cu
m
u
la
ti
ve
gr
ow
th
o
f
h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
ed
p
er
w
o
rk
er
a
ft
er
th
e
tr
o
u
g
h
u
si
n
g
li
n
ea
rl
y
d
et
re
n
d
ed
se
ri
es
52
Chapter 2
Long Working Hours Make
Us Less Productive but
Also Less Costly
Co-authored with Vincent Vandenberghe
This paper develops and assesses empirically a simple model of
firms’ optimal decision regarding working hours, where productivity
varies with hours and where the firm faces quasi-fixed labour costs.
Using Belgian firm-level data on production, labour costs, workers,
and hours, and focusing on the estimation of elasticities along the
isoquant and the isocost, we find evidence of not only declining pro-
ductivity of hours but also of quasi-fixed labour costs in the range
of 20 per cent of total labour costs. The tentative conclusion is that
firms facing such costs are enticed to raise working hours, even if
this results in lower productivity.
2.1 Introduction
A renewed interest in reducing working hours has recently been observed in
many countries. In the wake of the 2008 crisis, it has been proposed to combat
surging unemployment. It is also seen as a desirable corollary to longer careers
(i.e. part-time/gradual retirement schemes) that governments promote in re-
sponse to population ageing. The canonical model of labour supply states that
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a worker can flexibly choose his/her own work hours to maximize his or her
utility at any given wage.1 However, findings from several studies, reviewed
by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2013), suggest that workers cannot choose work
hours freely, or that a change of hours is conditional on a job change.2 In this
context, and following Pencavel’s call (Pencavel, 2016) for more research on the
demand of labour,3 this paper focuses on the preferences of firms regarding the
working hours of their employees.
In fact, once that intensive dimension of labour is introduced, firms must
make a non-trivial decision on the number of workers hired as well as on the
hours that are asked from them. A profit-maximizing firm will decide on the
number of workers to hire and on working hours by comparing the productiv-
ity and cost of both workers and hours. Labour productivity, whether at the
intensive or at the extensive margin, has already attracted a lot of interest in
the past. A first, rather old, stream or the economic literature develops the
idea that longer hours lead to counterproductive hardship. One of the first
economists to discuss it was Karl Marx in the Capital Vo. 1, Ch XV, Section
3 (c). Later John Hicks (1932) stated that “probably it has never entered the
heads of most employers . . . that hours could be shortened, and output main-
tained.” A milder version of his story is that, as workers slave away for longer
and longer, they lose energy, which makes them relatively less productive: in
other words, the last hours of work still raise total output but at a declining
rate. In contrast, Feldstein (1967) insists on the importance of ‘slack’ hours. He
argues that many hours amount to setting-up time, refreshment breaks, time
around lunch, and deliver no output. These paid-but-non-productive hours do
not rise proportionately with the number of hours officially worked. An in-
crease in the length of the official working day or week could therefore entail
a more than proportionate increase in the number of effective hours of works.
Our empirical work follows the conclusions by Leslie and Wise (1980), or more
recently by Pencavel (2015) or Collewet and Sauermann (2017) that give credit
1Workers’ preferences regarding hours have largely been studied in previous work (see,
e.g., Barzel, 1973; Freeman and Gottschalk, 1998) and more recent one by Rogerson, Keane
& Wallenius (2009, 2011).
2For example, in his survey on labour supply, Heckman (1993) concludes that most of the
variability in labour supply can be explained by extensive margins (i.e. worker flows into
and out of the labour market), whereas intensive margins (i.e. changes in hours worked) are
extremely small. Using job-mover data, Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1988, 1992) or Senesky
(2005) suggest that choices of wages and hours are available only as a ‘package’; therefore, a
worker is not able to change work hours flexibly unless he or she changes jobs.
3The relative importance of the demand for labour has also been highlighted by Bryan
(2007) and Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2003).
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to the hardship story, but it in its mild form: average productivity of hours is
decreasing in the number of hours, due to the decreasing marginal productiv-
ity. This result is, however, only valid at the observed number of hours worked
and does not contradict the presence of slack hours due to decreasing number
of hours worked.
So, could it be that employers have it all wrong when they oppose reducing
working hours even though it could boost productivity? Not necessarily if,
as proposed by Oi (1962), Donaldson and Eaton (1984), Dixon and Freebairn
(2009) or Kuroda and Yamamoto (2013), the existence of quasi-fixed labour
costs is considered. The main contribution of this work is to shed light on the
role of quasi-fixed labour costs in understanding firms’ demand for hours. The
notion deserves some clarification. Fixed costs of production already benefited
from attentive scrutiny in the economic literature. They are usually understood
as any financial cost — most often corresponding the cost of capital — not
dependent on the level of goods or services produced. Less often explored,
quasi-fixed labour costs are the focus of this paper and arise from the explicit
modelling of both the intensive and the extensive margin of employment. Here,
following Hamermesh’s (1993) typology, quasi-fixed labour costs (F) reflect the
propensity of a worker’s compensation to be not strictly indexed on the hours
of work delivered (H) (but rather on the number of workers N). That comprises
not only the lump-sum part of pay, non-proportional taxes, or social security
contributions, fixed insurance premia, indivisible perks like a company car but
also recruitment/training or redundancy/firing costs.
Hamermesh distinguished two types of quasi-fixed labour costs. First, the
‘recurring fixed costs’ (R). These are the costs associated with non-wage re-
muneration and fringe benefits: the health insurance, leasing car, paid sickness
leave (as well as any other type of leave where the worker remains paid while not
delivering any hour). Second ‘one-time fixed cost’ (T ). In Hamermesh’s typol-
ogy these are costs that are paid only once per worker. They typically consist of
the cost of (externally or internally provided) training, the cost of operating an
HR department, and dismissal costs. At the level of a firm, the one-time fixed
costs will enter F pro rata the likelihood q of turnover F = R+qT . In contrast,
variable labour costs are those that vary with the number of hours; and will
typically correspond to the product of hours by an hourly wage rate (w(H)H).
The total labour cost of a typical firm thus writes C(N,H) = N(w(H)H +F ).
In the presence of significant labour quasi- fixed costs (F ), raising the number
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of hours per worker will decrease the average cost and raise profitability ceteris
paribus.
Evidence gathered in this paper, using firm-level data covering the whole
Belgian private for-profit economy, suggests both a declining productivity of
hours, and a declining average cost per additional hour worked. Using annual
firm-level data over a 9-year period (2007–2015), we show that in the Belgian
private economy firms operate around a level of hours per year that is synony-
mous with decreasing average productivity: thus, shorter hours could have a
positive effect on labour productivity (value added per hour). But analysing
the relationship between total labour cost and hours, we also find strong ev-
idence of substantial quasi-fixed labour costs (around 20–23 per cent of total
labour costs) suggesting that maximizing firms have an incentive to push hours
beyond the point where labour productivity is maximal. To our knowledge, this
paper is the first to quantify quasi-fixed labour costs using only econometric
estimates of labour cost functions. So far, economists like Hart (1984), Ehren-
berg (2016) or Martins (2004) have always resorted to an intrinsically more
descriptive (and time-consuming) approach that consists of an in-depth anal-
ysis of accounting data, guided by a knowledge of institutional or contractual
arrangements underpinning labour compensation. Finally, it is worth stressing
that our paper goes beyond simply quantifying quasi-fixed labour costs. It also
assesses their economic significance by looking at their impact on firms’ actual
labour decisions. Indeed, the paper reports evidence of substitution of hours for
workers (i.e. longer hours, less workers) in response to rising quasi-fixed labour
costs. This result aligns with those published by Cutler and Madrian (1998);
Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993); Buchmueller (1999) or Dolfin (2006); who
use descriptive estimation of quasi-fixed labour costs.
One of the tentative conclusions of the paper it that, akin so many other
aspects of economic life, the decision of firms on working hours amounts to a
trade-off: reducing working hours might improve labour productivity, but it
could also raise average labour cost per hour. A better understanding of firms’
or industries’ incentives to reduce or raise working hours should help policy
making. For example, to promote part-time employment for the older workers,
policy makers should prioritize industries with low quasi-fixed labour costs or
foster tax and compensation policies that ensure that employer costs are as
proportional as possible to hours of work.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 exposes a model of
the profit-maximizing firm that has all power to not only decide on the number
of workers but also on the number of hours each worker must work. The model
highlights the likely determinants of the demand for workers and working hours,
the role of the productivity of hours, and that of quasi-fixed labour costs. It also
suggests a way to identify econometrically the share of fixed labour costs as the
workers/hours elasticity along the isocost. Section 2.3 presents and discusses
the economic and institutional mechanisms that in the Belgian context generate
quasi-fixed labour costs. Section 2.4 describes the panel of firm-level data that
is used. Section 2.5 exposes our econometric analysis and results. We first
present baseline estimates of the productivity of working hours and of the
share of quasi-fixed labour costs in total labour costs. Second, we introduce an
industry-by-industry analysis that shows that industries with larger quasi-fixed
labour costs tend to have higher average working hours higher and make less
use of part-time work. Section 2.6 presents further evidences about quasi-fixed
labour costs at the worker-level and from an international perspective. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Working hours as a firm-level decision
Consider a technology where effective labour consists of hours (H) and worker
(N), where hours of presence (H) do not equal effective hours of labour g(H).
The production function is as follows:
Q(K;L) ≤ f(K;L) (2.1)
where L = Ng(H) and g′(H) > 0 (2.2)
Assuming that g(H) = H for every possible value of H is probably un-
realistic. Doubling hours per worker will not double the amount of effective
hours/labour. As soon as one lifts the assumption of identity, the labour de-
mand can no longer be simply considered as employers just choosing an optimal
number of worker-hours (i.e. the product N.H equal to L) (Hamermesh 1993)
— with the level of H being essentially a matter of workers’ preferences in terms
of revenue versus leisure. In this model, we make the opposite assumption that
employers are free to choose the number of hours worked per worker as well as
the number of workers. It is worth noting that the specific form for L(N,H)
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will lead to the absence of scale effect on firm’s optimal number of hours per
worker H*: the latter is independent of the size of the firm (measured by N).
Following Cahuc et al. (2014), we assume firms face the following sequence
of choices: first, firm choose between hours and workers by minimizing their
labour cost, second they choose between labour (optimally composed of hours
and workers) and capital. This sequential choice hypothesis implies that hours
versus workers decisions are invariant to firm size and therefore separable from
capital.4 The employers’ problem can then be viewed as one of mini- miz-
ing total labour cost C(N,H) subject to the technological constraint Y ≤
f(K,Ng(H)). The optimum (H∗, N∗) is described by a series of FOC that
lead after some manipulations to equating the ratio of marginal productivities
to the ratio of marginal labour costs:
LH
LN
=
CH
CN
(2.3)
or equivalently using (2.2) and assuming that the true generating process
for labour cost is:
C(N,H) = FF +N(w(H)H + F ) (2.4)
where w(H) is the hourly wage (‘variable labour costs’) and rises with H
(w′ > 0) to reflect, among other, the legal obligation to pay more for ex-
tra hours. Modelling the overtime premium as a continuous increasing hourly
wage function allows to compute elasticities that we will be able to estimate in
the dataset. The alternative modelling option is to have an overtime premium
paid per hour above a legal threshold, however, our data would not allow us to
estimate the increase in remuneration at the threshold.
F denotes labour quasi-fixed costs (i.e. costs that are invariant to the number
of hours per worker, but vary with the number of workers).
FF are firm-level fixed costs [i.e. costs that are invariant to the number of
workers (human resources personnel, administrative procedures vis-a-vis insur-
ers, public authorities)].
4The sequence of choice has been documented before and it seems realistic to think that
capital/ labour ratio decisions are subject to a different timing than hours/workers decisions.
Would this assumption be lifted, the final signs of derivatives would be indeterminate and
depend on capital, workers, and hours complementarity (Hart, 1984).
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we get
LH
LN
=
Ng′(H)
g(H)
=
CH
CN
=
Nw′(H)H + w(H)N
w(H)H + F
(2.5)
One can also restate the equilibrium using the implicit function theorem,5
where the ratio of marginal productivities LH/LN is equal to the slope of the
isoquant:
−LH
LN
=
dN
dH |dL=0
(2.6)
And multiplying by H/N leads to the elasticity along the isoquant σ(H,N):
−H
N
LH
LN
=
H
N
dN
dH |dL=0
= −σ(H,N) (2.7)
Similarly, the ratio of hours and men marginal labour cost CH/CN can be
related to the elasticity of substitution along the isocost γ(H,N):
−H
N
CH
CN
=
H
N
dN
dH |dC=0
= −γ(H,N) (2.8)
Thus, as alternative to (2.3), the optimum N∗, H∗ can be described as
the equality of the slopes of the isoquant/isocost in the (N,H) space; or the
equality of the elasticities of hours per worker along both the isoquant and
isocost (Dixon et al., 2005):
σ(H,N) = γ(H,N) (2.9)
or equivalently, given (2.2) and (2.4):
σ(H,N) =
g′(H)
g(H)
H
= γ(H,N) =
1 + 
1 + rF
(2.10)
5dL = 0 = LHdH + LNdN
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where:  ≡ w′(H)w(H)
H
is the elasticity of hourly wage to working hours;6
rF ≡ Fw(H)H the ratio of fixed to variable worker-level labour costs.
Note that (2.10) can be rewritten as γ(H;N) = (1+)w(H)H/(W (H)H+F )
showing that c(H,N) it is the upper bound (e ≥ 0) of the share of variable costs
in total labour costs. As a consequence, hereafter, 1−γ(H;N) will interpreted
as a lower bound estimate of the share of quasi-fixed labour costs in total labour
costs.
Equation (2.10)means thatH∗ is such that the ratio of its marginal to average
productivity g
′(H)
g(H)
H
equals (1 + e(H)/1 + rF ). The higher quasi-fixed costs
relative to the sensitivity of wage rate to hours, the more likely γ(H,N) will be
less than 1 (in absolute value) (Figure 2.1, lower part). Simultaneously, if that is
the case employers will push for longer hours; certainly, beyond the point where
marginal productivity starts declining (presumably due to hardship, lassitude),
and beyond the point where average productivity of hours reaches its maximum
(Figure 2.1, upper part) i.e. σ(H,N) < 1 .7 Said differently, the only reason
for firms to push working hours to the point where average productivity is
declining, is that they are better able to spread fixed costs.
This finally leads to positing that the (conditional) labour demand for work-
ing hours looks like
H∗ ≡ q(
−︷︸︸︷
σ ) = m(
−︷︸︸︷
γ ) = m(
+︷︸︸︷
F ,
−︷︸︸︷
 ) (2.11)
with the last right-hand term reflecting the positive relationship between
hours and quasi-fixed labour cost.
6Driven by overtime wage premia or a higher incidence of employer-paid sick leave when
H rises.
7Mathematically, the sign of the slope (or derivative) of the average productivity is de-
termined by the difference/ratio between the average productivity and the marginal produc-
tivity: d(g(H)/H)/dH = g′(H)/Hg(H)/H2) = [g′(H)g(H)/H]/H. If g′(H) < g(H)/H (i.e.
if r(H) < 1) we necessarily have a negative slope for the average productivity, meaning that
we are beyond its maxi- mum. And marginal productivity of hours is declining (Figure 2.1,
upper part).
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Figure 2.1: Optimal hours, ratio of marginal to average productivity of hours
and quasi-fixed labour costs (F1 > F0).
2.3 The economic and institutional factors un-
derpinning quasi-fixed labour costs in the
Belgian context
As stressed in the introduction, one of the novelties of this paper is to quan-
tify quasi-fixed costs using econometric estimates of the elasticities along firm’s
labour isocost and isoquant. What has been done on quasi-fixed costs in the
existing empirical literature (Ehrenberg, 2016; Hart, 1984; Martins , 2004) con-
sists of analysing accounting data, and identify the components that qualify as
being (quasi)-fixed, based on relatively detailed and country-specific knowledge
of institutional or contractual arrangements underpinning labour compensa-
tion. The advantage of our econometric approach — and of the algebra from
which it derives, see Section 2.2 —, is that there is no need to invest time in
scanning firms’ financial reports or to develop an in-depth understanding of in-
stitutions. Our results simply derive from the estimation of the parameters of
either a production function or a labour cost function comprising the duration
of work and the number of workers. The challenge is more to estimate these
functions correctly, and avoid statistical biases. This said, it is quite natural
for the reader who discovers our results — quasi-fixed costs in the range of 20
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per cent — to ask, in the context of Belgium, which might be the actual drivers
and determinants of these fixed costs. The lines that follow try to answer that
interrogation.
2.3.1 One-time fixed costs
A starting point is to discuss the presence ‘one-time fixed costs’: recruitment,
firing/severance, and training costs (Hamermesh, 1993). These exist in Bel-
gium. The singularity of Belgium probably is that its severance costs — par-
ticularly for white collars — are very high (i.e. in excess of one year of pay
white-collar workers with seniority) — and may be a significant contributor to
Belgium’s overall level of quasi-fixed costs.8
2.3.2 Recurrent quasi-fixed labour costs
Things are trickier when it comes to ‘recurrent’ quasi-fixed labour costs; that
labour economists traditionally associate to nonwage compensation (pension/
unemployment/ health insurance, paid sick or holiday leave, perks). In Bel-
gium, not all of these amount to ‘purely’ quasi-fixed costs, as some are directly
or indirectly indexed on hours. Only a cautious, case-by-case examination may
lead to a definite judgement as to their degree of ‘fixity’.
Strictly speaking in Belgium, all social security contributions (financing the
health insurance, the unemployment insurance and legal pensions; i.e. the 1st
pillar) are computed as a percentage of the gross remuneration, that is itself
proportional to the number of hours worked. Therefore, these contributions do
not a priori qualify as ‘fixed’. Also, in principle, important mandatory benefits
(end-of-year bonus, single and double holiday bonuses) are directly indexed on
annual hours of work. For instance, if the worker has been absent during the
year, the amount of her end-of-the-year bonus is reduced pro rata the number
of days of absence. The same logic holds for occupational pensions (the so-
called 2nd pillar of the pension system, paid by the employers to top-up legal
pensions). Instalments are indexed on salaries, and thus on hours.
Belgium has many regimes of ‘assimilation’ i.e. days not worked but ‘as-
similated’ to days of work and thus remunerated and/or qualifying for social
security payments. The most important one is the regime of employer-paid sick
8Prorata the likelihood of dismissal/separation.
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leave.9 The list also comprises maternity/parental leave, educational/training
leave, union leave. There is also a regime of ‘economic unemployment’; i.e.
situations of temporary economic recess where workers are sent home but are
still paid by the employers. All these ‘assimilated’ days give rise to sizeable
additional labour costs. But a priori, these are indexed on hours worked. Math-
ematically, if H1 is the number of hours actually worked and H2 is the number
of ‘assimilated’ hours, the total labour cost writes C = F + w(H1 + H2). If
H2/H1 = a is constant (ex: a probability of illness...), then the assimilated days
are similar to variable costs i.e. C = F + w(1 + a)H1. Simply, the effective
wage rate writes w(1 + a) and is inflated pro rata the share a of ‘assimilated’
hours. However, in practice, there are reasons to believe that a = H2/H1 is de-
creasing with H1. Why? The most obvious case is that of temporary/economic
unemployment. It typically intervenes during periods of overall reduction of
the number hours worked (i.e. low H1). Also, some ‘assimilation’ regimes
(e.g. maternity leave) tend to work predominantly to the benefit of workers
who work less hours (women). Similarly, one relatively unknown feature of
Belgium’s occupational pensions is the presence of ‘social’ contributions: extra
payments by employers aimed at improving the pension capital of the lowest
earners; that also often correspond to those working less hours.10
Then there is the case of perks and in-kind benefits. Mainly for fiscal rea-
sons,11 Belgian employers are prone to remunerate their employees in kind.
The point is that many in-kinds are ‘fixed’. The most significant one is the
company car. It represents up to 20 per cent of a worker’s gross remunera-
9Paid sickness leaves represent a large cost for firms. In fact, in the Belgian system,
sickness leave is highly comparable to paid holiday in terms of cost for the firm. The first
30 days of each sick leave are paid for by the employer; and days of absence due to sickness
still entitle workers to the associ- ated yearly premium, paid holidays, pension and health
insurances. After 30 consecutive days, the replacement wage is paid for by the social security
and the worker may lose some of the perks. On average in Belgium, 50 per cent of employees
take at least 1 day of sick leave per year. Among those, sick leaves last on average 13 days
but the average number of days paid by the firm is around 5 days. The percentage of workers
taking at least one sick day is similar among blue and white collars, but the average leave
length is quite different, 8 days for white collar (five paid for by the firm), 16 days for blue
collar (seven paid for by the firm). The share of workers taking at least one day of sick leave
also strongly increases with the size (number of workers) of the firm: from 32 per cent for
firms of one to four workers up to 60 per cent for the largest firms (above 1,000 workers)
Securex (2011).
10Formally, the consequences of H2/H1 being non-constant are that the average labour cost
per hour becomes C/H1 = F/H1 + w(1 + α(H1)) and the derivative with respect to hours
worked d(C/H1)/dH1 = −F/H21 + wdα(H1)/dH1. So if dα(H1)/dH1 < 0, the deflating
effect of longer hours of work H1 is magnified.
11Belgium is characterized by a very large fiscal wedge on labour. One way for companies
and workers to reduce payment is to resort to in-kind benefits.
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tion and is very common in Belgium.12 Other in- kinds comprise home/work
travel allowances,13 mobile phones, laptops and tablets. Also, employers must
insure each employee against the risk of workplace and home-to-work commut-
ing accident. Whatever the number of hours worked, employees benefit from
mandatory, employer-paid, health checks performed in the workplace. All in
all, in-kind benefits were estimated to be around 14 per cent of the labour cost
for Belgian workers (Labour Cost Survey, SPF Economie, 2012).
Other sources of ‘fixity’ are worth mentioning. In Belgium, there are rules
imposing that employers do not pay less than a certain amount, even if the
number of hours actually worked is small. For part-timers, the Belgian leg-
islation imposes that contracts (and the remuneration they generate) should
be a least equivalent to a weekly minimum of one-third of the reference full
time; with a daily minimum of 3 hours. Remuneration minima for night-shift
workers (i.e. those who worker after 10 PM) are even stricter.14 If, with some
positive likelihood, the actual duration of work is inferior to these thresholds,
then the hourly wage rises considerably. In that sense, these rules can lead to
a caricature of the idea of quasi-fixed labour costs.
Finally — but this is not specific to Belgium, — compensation schemes
for middle or top managers tend to amount to quasi lump-sum commitments.
They receive an annual salary (+ in-kinds) for an indicative number of hours
of service; that de facto fluctuates considerably, with no or little impact on the
amount received. Ceteris paribus, the more prevalent these schemes, the more
labour costs should appear a quasi fixed.
2.4 Data
The data we use in this paper essentially come from Bel-First (Tables 2.1–2.4,
Figure 2.2),15 that all for-profit firms located in Belgium must feed to com-
ply with the legal prescriptions on income declaration. It consists of a large
unbalanced panel of 115,337 firm-year observations corresponding to the situa-
tion of 14,544 firms with at least 20 employees, from all industries forming the
122015 figures suggest that 15 per cent of all employed workers in Belgium benefit from a
com- pany car.
13Akin full-time workers, part-time workers are fully eligible.
14Min{6 hours, typical day-shift number of hours}
15http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/National/Bel-First.aspx
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for-profit Belgian private economy,16 in the period 2007– 2015.17 Our dataset
comprises a large variety of firms. First along the firm size dimension, we
include all data for firms from 20 workers (FTE) to very large firms (above
1,000 workers), corresponding to well-known international companies.18 These
firms are largely documented in terms of industry (NACE19 or NAICS20), size
(number of workers), capital used (total equity), total labour cost (more on
this below) and productivity (value added).
Descriptive statistics on this large sample are reported in Tables 2.1–2.4. One
of the originalities of this paper is to consider both the productivity and the
labour cost of hours and workers. Table 2.2 contains descriptive statistics on
productivity (Q/N where Q is value added) and average labour costs (C/N).
The latter is logically inferior to productivity.
Number of firms
2007 11944
2008 12213
2009 12369
2010 12698
2011 12949
2012 13272
2013 13365
2014 13370
2015 13157
Total 115337
N 115337
Source: Bel-first(2016)
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, number of firms
In this paper, labour costs are measured as a firm-level aggregate indepen-
dently from production. They include the value of all wage and non-wage
compensations paid to or on behalf of the total labour force (both full- and
16We remove the primary sector (agriculture and mining) as well as the public/non-profit
industry (NACE 1-digit codes ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘T’, ‘U’).
17The analysis has also been performed on 2005–2014 data without any impact on the
conclusions.
18Such as Volvo, Arcelor, Audi, GSK, Electrabel, Colruyt, Delhaize, Carrefour, AIB-
Vinc¸otte and 10 large interim firms (Randstad, Adecco, Start People, T-Groep, Tempo Team,
Daoust, Manpower).
19European industrial activity classification (Nomenclature scientifique des Activite´
e´conomiques dans la Communaute´ Europe´enne).
20North American Industry Classification System
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Figure 2.2: Annual average working hours per worker: (a) full-time and part-
time and (b) full-time only. Distribution across firms. Belgium
private economy 2007–2015.
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Value
added
per empl.
[EUR]
Labour
cost per
empl.
[EUR]
Capital
per empl.
[EUR]
Hours
per
empl.
[an-
nual]
Workers
full
time
Workers
part
time
Workers
in-
terim
2007 77,133.03 43,237.04 325,163.3 1,472.4 80.38 24.78 14.57
2008 78,996.69 44,680.06 413,030.7 1,472.4 80.77 24.83 12.98
2009 73,856.15 45,153.60 426,619.2 1,428.4 76.80 24.97 11.51
2010 76,494.41 45,898.61 322,024.1 1,433.2 74.66 25.57 12.59
2011 79,430.76 47,709.65 610,067.9 1,437.2 76.33 27.14 12.28
2012 76,136.48 49,003.94 639,064.7 1,427.9 75.78 28.02 12.57
2013 76,403.06 49,705.03 485,220.0 1,422.4 75.44 29.02 12.81
2014 77,347.08 50,599.59 462,562.8 1,427.7 90.82 36.38 12.37
2015 79,568.47 50,779.37 329,668.3 1,430.1 75.33 37.95 13.67
Total 77,269.98 47,517.51 447,715.7 1,438.5 78.49 28.87 12.81
N 115337
Source: Bel-first(2016)
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics, main variables
part-time plus interim/temporary workers) on an annual basis. Labour costs
comprise: annual gross wage (including end-of-the year bonuses, paid holi-
day/sickness/maternity leave), employees’ social contributions (representing
13.07 per cent of gross wage), employers’ contributions to social security (38 per
cent of the gross wage), employers’ contributions to extra-legal insurances and
pensions, stocks, and other (taxable) perks like ‘meal vouchers’, company car,
mobile phone. Most of the costs of externally provided training are included
in the firms’ total labour cost used here.21 And so are Belgium’s notoriously
high severance payments including the special regimes applicable to older work-
ers.22,23
All in all, the firm-level aggregate that we use is thus likely to capture most of
the ‘recurrent’ and ‘one-time’ quasi-fixed costs mentioned in the introduction.
Still there is a need of an in-depth analysis of which of these items can be con-
sidered as genuinely ‘fixed’. By contrast, our aggregate does not comprise the
costs for externally-provided search/recruitment and training. These appear
in the books as intermediates. Also, internal training costs, as well as those of
21Account 648 ‘Other Personnel Expenses’.
22By contrast, the cost of workers in a pre-retirement scheme is not counted anymore when
fully retired. If partially retired (‘ame´nagement de fin de carrie`re’), they count as part-time
workers; and the worker replacing them for the other part-time is counted.
23Unemployment with complement paid by the former employer (‘comple´ment
d’entreprise’); account 624 Retirement and survival pensions.
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Number
of empl.
Av.
hours
[full-time
w.]
Av.
hours
[part-
time
w.]
Av.
hours
[interim
w.]
Share of
full-time
w.
Share of
part-time
w.
Share of
interim
w.
p25 27.00 1,464.92 857.25 1,634.33 0.68 0.06 0.00
p50 40.00 1,581.86 1,044.60 1,883.59 0.83 0.12 0.00
p75 74.00 1,666.90 1,201.75 2,004.15 0.92 0.27 0.03
N 115337
Source: Bel-first(2016)
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics, workers hours
Number of workers (n) Working time(wkt) Working time FT(wkt ft)
Std-error 823.32 337.12 280.08
Std error(between) 454.15 281.62 207.00
Std error(within) 686.73 185.31 188.67
Within share of total var. 0.696 0.302 0.454
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Bel-first
Table 2.4: Focus on within firm variation
HR departments involved in search and recruitment are unlikely to appear in
our data as fixed labour costs. This is because they essentially take the form of
wages paid to specialized workers (who also deliver a certain number of hours
just like any other employee of the firms). In our data, there is no way to
isolate their labour cost.
Of crucial importance in this paper is the distinction between the number of
workers (N) and the number of hours (H) (Table 2.2 right-hand columns, Table
2.3). The former is simply the headcount, or more precisely the average over
the year of the headcount at the end of each month. The latter corresponds
to the number of worked and paid hours over the year.24 It does not consider
unpaid overtime, holidays, sick leaves, short-term absences, and hours lost due
to strikes or for any other reasons.
The average hours worked varies strongly in our sample; even among full-
time workers (Figure 2.2). The standard deviation of hours worked (overall
or for full-time workers only) within firm is only slightly smaller than between
firms (Table 2.4). Generally, we observe non-negligible variation of both hours
24Unlike hours found in the social security database, Belfirst data on hours do not suffer
from the ‘assimilation’ bias: i.e. hours that are assimilated to worked hours in the definition of
social (e.g. pension) rights. The only serious issue with Bel-first is thus the underestimation
of worked hours due to unpaid overtime (something this seems to be common among white-
collar workers).
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and workers within firm, over time representing more than 30 per cent of total
variation.25 This observation of large within-firm variations is important to
allow for meaningful firm-level fixed effect regressions in the subsequent econo-
metric analysis. In the extension of the main econometric analysis (Section
2.6) we also use individual-level international data from PIAAC.26
2.5 Econometric analysis of firm-level data
In this section, using firm-level panel data, we estimate both production and
labour cost functions27 with the aim of assessing the productivity of working
hours and the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed labour costs. The advantage
of firm-level data is that workers and hours can be analysed simultaneously.
And as the data consist of panels, they can be used to control for firm-level
unobserved heterogeneity as well as for the risk of simultaneity bias (both
being synonymous with endogeneity). What is more, the dataset is sufficiently
large to allow for: (i) the identification of cross-industry differences (in terms of
σ(H;N); γ(H,N)) and (ii) an econometric analysis of these differences’ impact
in terms of duration of hours or the incidence of part-time work (Section 2.5.2).
2.5.1 Identification strategy
The simple model, spelled out in Section 2.2, suggests that hours worked per
worker are determined at the firm level by the equality of the elasticity along
the workers–hours isoquant curve σ(H;N) to the elasticity along the isocost
curve γ(H,N), assuming firms operate at their cost-minimization optimum.
We use Belgian annual firm-level data on total labour cost (wages, contribu-
tions to social security and paid holidays, annual bonuses) alongside informa-
tion about annual hours and number of workers in each of the firms present in
the dataset. As we do not observe fixed costs F and the elasticity of unit wage
to hours worked , there is no way we can directly compute γ(H,N) as specified
in (2.10). The same applies for σ(H;N). But these elasticities can be retrieved
by estimating nth order polynomial approximations of (the log of) C(H,N))
and Q(K,H,N), respectively. In the case of second-order approximations (i.e.
25Even after removing outliers: i.e. firms declaring hours per worker to be, on average over
all workers, below 100 or above 3,000 annual hours, mostly due to encoding errors.
26The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
27Not to be confounded with the traditional [production] cost function i.e. a function of
input prices and output quantity.
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translog specification) we have
cit ≈ A+ θnit + λhit + 1
2
χ1h
2
it +
1
2
χ2n
2
it + χ3hitnit + Tt + νit(2.12)
qit ≈ B + αkitβnit + pihit + 1
2
ψ1h
2
it +
1
2
ψ2n
2
it + ψ3hitnit + Tt + µit(2.13)
where lower case c, q, h, n correspond to the log of C, Q, H, N, respectively,
Tt are time dummies, and νit, µit the residuals.
The derivatives of these translogs vis-a-vis n and h are equal [ignoring firm
and time indices] to:
∂c
∂n
=
∂lnC
∂lnN
=
CN
C/N
≈ θ + χ2n+ χ3h (2.14)
∂c
∂h
=
∂lnC
∂lnH
=
CH
C/H
≈ λ+ χ1h+ χ3n (2.15)
∂q
∂n
=
∂lnQ
∂lnN
=
QN
Q/N
≈ β + ψ2n+ ψ3h (2.16)
∂q
∂h
=
∂lnQ
∂lnH
=
QH
Q/H
≈ pi + ψ1h+ ψ3n (2.17)
and thus following (2.7), (2.8) the elasticities along the isocost/isoquant can
be approximated using the estimated parameters of (2.12), (2.13):
γ(H,N) ≡ H
N
CH
CN
≈ λ+ χ1h+ χ3n
θ + χ2n+ χ3h
(2.18)
σ(H,N) ≡ H
N
QH
QN
≈ pi + ψ1h+ ψ3n
β + ψ2n+ ψ3h
(2.19)
In particular, with a true cost function (2.4) C(N,H) = FF +N(wH +F )
and using (2.10)
γ(H,N) ≡ H
N
CH
CN
=
λ+ χ1h+ χ3n
θ + χ2n+ χ3h
≡ 1 + 
1 + rF
(2.20)
or equivalently, if unit wages do not vary with hours (i.e.  = 0) we get and
estimation for the share of fixed costs in total labour cost of an employee as:
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1− γ(H,N) = F
F + w(H)H
≡ λ+ χ1h+ χ3n
θ + χ2n+ χ3h
(2.21)
Note that expressions (2.18), (2.19) boil down to [respectively] λ/θ [pi/β]
when χ’s [ψ’s] are null (i.e. first-order polynomial approximation also equiv-
alent to the Cobb–Douglas specification). Note finally that all our estimates
allow for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. residuals µit = ωit+ρit; (and
similarly for the residual of the cost function), with ωit being a time-invariant
firm-level unobserved term potentially correlated with outcome variables and
labour ones. In subsequent developments we also allow for simultaneity bias;
i.e. µit = ωit + ρit with ωit being a time-variant unobserved term (correspond-
ing, e.g., to partially anticipated demand chocks) also potentially correlated
simultaneously to output and labour decisions (Ackerberg et al., 2015; Levin-
sohn and Petrin, 2003).
2.5.2 Results
All industries pooled
A first set of key results are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Estimated co-
efficients using firm-level mean-centred variables — not only corresponding to
equations (2.12), (2.13) but also order 1 simplifications or order 3 generaliza-
tions — are reported in the upper part of the table, whereas the implied elas-
ticities γ(Hit, Nit) (2.18) σ(Hit, Nit) (2.19) along (respectively) the isoquant
and the isocost are reported in the lower part of the table. Focusing on the
latter, we can see that they are systematically (and statistically significantly)
less than 1. For instance, the model delivers a value of σ = 0.80, in line with
results of the literature on the elasticity of output to hours (Anxo and Big-
sten, 1989; Cahuc et al., 2014; Cette et al., 2015; Leslie and Wise, 1980). The
FE effects model using first-differenced data are presented in the Table 2.6 de-
liver estimates that are qualitatively similar, suggesting an absence of a serious
problem with serial correlation of the residuals in our panel data.28
28Although both mean-centering (Table 2.5) and first-differencing (FD) (Table 2.6) aim at
the same thing (remove a fixed effect) they do not necessarily generate the same results. The
main difference stems from the way they transform the OLS residuals and a problem known
in the literature on panels as ‘serial correlation’ (i.e. the fact luck in 1 year might correlate
(or not) with luck in other years). Both mean-centering and FD rely on some assumptions.
In short, FD is more appropriate when there is serial correlation, while mean-centering is
more appropriate (in the sense that it is more effective at removing the time-invariant fixed
effect) in the absence of serial correlation. This justifies implementing both methods, even if
it is to observe that they generate similar results.
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Long Working Hours Make Us Less Productive but Also Less
Costly
In Table 2.7, we exploit the fact that our data permit replicating the labour
cost analysis (using FE-first differences) for three types of employment con-
tracts: full-time (forming the largest part of the total), part-time, and in-
terim/temporary.29 Two interesting results emerge. First, all types of contracts
are associated with quasi-fixed labour costs as all estimated c are statistically
less than 1. Fixed costs appear significantly higher for full-time employees30 :
at least 34 per cent compared to 15.4 per cent and 5.4 per cent for part-timers
and interims, respectively. This result is in line with the model’s prediction that
job positions that are associated with higher quasi-fixed costs should be filled
with full-time workers, whereas part-timers should only be hired when quasi-
fixed costs are relatively low. Results regarding temporary workers should be
interpreted with caution, as the data for such workers is much weaker: only
a small proportion of firms report the presence of temporary workers and the
reporting is based on hours invoiced by the interim company.
In Table 2.8, we explore the varying importance of quasi-fixed labour costs
across broadly defined (NACE1) and contrasted industries: manufacturing, re-
tail, and accommodation/ restaurants. The analysis is done separately for the
three industries, using FE-first differences. Conditional on hourly wage elastic-
ity () to be uniformly distributed, fixed costs appear to be significantly higher
in manufacturing (at least 40 per cent) compared to retail and accommoda-
tion/restaurants (26 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively). These differences
can reflect differences in the labour cost structure between sectors due to, e.g.,
historically different institutional arrangements of the type listed in Section 2.3.
For further results on industry-by-industry results, see Section 2.5.2 below.
In Table 2.9, we present the results when endogeneity stems both from fixed
effects (unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity) and simultaneity (unob-
served, final demand-related, short-run shocks that can affect simultaneously
outcomes variables and the level of labour inputs).31 To control for that risk we
29Interims are workers who, from a legal point of view, are employed by interim agencies
and ‘sold’ to the firm where we observe them, for short periods of time (hence, the fact that
they are also referred to as ‘temporary’ workers) and the accomplishment of a speccialized
task.
30And this in spite of the fact that wage elasticity () — which leads to an underestimation
of the share quasi-fixed labour costs Equation (2.10) — could be higher for full-timers due
to overtime premia.
31For instance, the simultaneity of a negative shock (due to the loss of a major contract)
and a reduction in hours worked, causing reverse causality: from productivity drop to hours
contraction. Alternatively, focusing on the estimation of the labour cost function, the simul-
taneity between a positive shock (e.g. the landing of a big contract, triggering an overall rise
of wages) and a rise of the number of hours worked, also causing a reverse causality problem
74
2.5 Econometric analysis of firm-level data
All types of workers Full-time workers Part-time workers Interim workers
nit 0.815
∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
hit 0.642
∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
n2it 0.0392
∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.00744∗∗∗ 0.00388∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
h2it -0.00771
∗∗∗ 0.00261∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ 0.00112
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
nithit 0.0326
∗∗∗ 0.0378∗∗∗ -0.00553 -0.00274
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 98961 98224 88936 31205
R2 0.603 0.558 0.560 0.859
Control year and firm fixed effects
γ 0.64 0.66 0.85 0.95
prob = 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Bel-first
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.7: Econometric estimation of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed
labour costs. Breakdown by type of contract (full-time, part-time,
and interim). Note that only large firms are required to report
information on temporary workers’ hours and cost separately (large
firms are firms with more than 100 workers, or firms exceeding two
of the following thresholds: 50 FTE workers, AC7,300,000 turnover,
AC3,650,000 total balance sheet)
implement the more structural approach developed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) and more recently by Ackerberg et al. (2015) (ACF hereafter), which
primarily consists of using intermediate inputs (materials and other supplies)
to proxy short-term shocks. Results are qualitatively very similar to the ones
reported in previous tables where we control only for fixed effects. Even though
this suggests c that simultaneity is a relatively benign problem in our data, co-
efficients in Table 2.9 are our most robust and thus preferred ones. Referring to
Table 2.9’s ACF results,32 the tentative conclusion would be that quasi-fixed
labour costs account for at least 23 per cent of total labour costs. As far as we
know, this has never been estimated econometrically so far.
More generally, it should be noted for all tables that our contribution resides
principally in the correct estimation of elasticities along the isoquant (σ) and
the isocost (γ) to be both significantly lower than one. Estimations along the
isoquant are not new and should be understood as the demonstration that
[in particular a shock-driven rise of hourly wage elasticity () that may translate into γ being
underestimated].
32See Vandenberghe (2017) for a full presentation of the LP and ACF proxy-variable idea,
and (Vandenberghe et al., 2013) for how it can be combined with fixed effects.
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All industries Manufacturing Wholesale and Retail Accommodation and Restaurants
nit 0.815*** 0.775*** 0.841*** 0.822***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
hit 0.642*** 0.594*** 0.732*** 0.780***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
n2it 0.0392*** 0.0568*** 0.0456*** 0.0185***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
h2it -0.00771*** -0.00730*** 0.0169*** -0.00947
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
nithit 0.0326*** 0.0548*** 0.0644*** 0.00862
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
R2 0.603 0.637 0.529 0.787
Control: year and firm fixed effects
γ 0.64 0.60 0.74 0.78
prob = 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Bel-first
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: Econometric estimation of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed
labour costs. Breakdown by broadly defined industries (Manufactur-
ing, Wholesale and Retail, and Accommodation and Restaurants)
our database yields results aligned with the existing empirical literature. On
the other hand, results regarding the isocost have not been shown before and
represent an important contribution to the literature on labour demand.
Industry-level analysis and the impact of quasi-fixed costs on the
demand for hours
In this section, we derive distinct estimates of γ(N,H) and σ(N,H) for each of
the NACE 3-digit industries in our dataset with the aim of assessing equation
(2.11); namely of a positive relationship between (estimated) quasi-fixed labour
costs and the demand for hours. The latter will be proxied by the firm-level
number of hours and the share of workers on a part-time contract. We first
estimate our productivity and labour cost equations separately for each indus-
try.33 Results are reported in Table 2.11 (Appendix) and can be visualized on
Figure 2.3. The latter suggests that the two estimates are strongly correlated
but not necessarily perfectly aligned. Values of σˆ, γˆ < 1 hint at the presence of
quasi-fixed labour costs whose effect dominates those of longer hours on unit
wage ( ≥ 0). Note that most of the large industries (representing more firms
and revealed by the size of the circles on Figure 2.3) display elasticities that are
significantly less than 1; an indication of the relative importance of quasi-fixed
labour costs.
33Using second-order polynomial approximations, fixed effect as first differences.
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LPa ACFb
Productivity Cost Productivity Cost
nit 0.645
∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
hit 0.475
∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
nit 0.756
∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
hit 0.564
∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.052)
Control: year and firm fixed effects [and (log of) capital in productivity equation]
σ; γ 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.75
prob= 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000
prob σ = γ 0.409 0.776
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Bel-first.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
aLevinsohn-Petrin, b Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer.
Cobb–Douglas specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H).
Table 2.9: Econometric estimation of the productivity of hours and of the (rel-
ative) importance of quasi-fixed labour costs. Fixed effect as mean
centring + accounting for simultaneity bias
Figure 2.3: Industry-by-industry estimation of σ and γ. Second-order polyno-
mial specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H).
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Productivity Labour costs
Working hours Share part-time contracts Working hours Share part-time contracts
σˆj ; γˆj -0.163∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Year fixed effect, output (log)
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Bel-first
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.10: Econometric results: impact of industry-level elasticity on work-
ing hours and prevalence (share) of part-time work contract; using
industry-by-industry estimated σˆj ; γˆj [FE (first diff.) and second-
order polynomial specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H)]
Figure 2.4: Working hours in 2015 as a function of industry-level estimated
isocost elasticity (γˆj).
More related to the point at the core of this paper, using these estimates γˆ
andσˆ as predictors of (conditional) labour demand equation (2.11) yields the
theoretically expected results (see Table 2.10, left part). The higher γˆ is (i.e.
the lower the estimated share of quasi-fixed costs), the lower the average annual
number of hours is (Table 2.10, col. 3 and Figure 2.4), and also the higher the
share of workers with a part-time contract (Table 2.10, col. 4 and Figure 2.5).
About the alignment of isoquant σˆ and isocost γˆ elasticities
One of the originalities of the paper is the conjoint study of the relationship
between hours, productivity, and labour costs. Given this, it is important to
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Figure 2.5: Share of part-time work in 2015 as of industry-level estimated iso-
cost elasticity (γˆj).
spend some time discussing the alignment of σ and γ. Theoretical developments
exposed in Section 2.2 suggest that firms should choose working hours (and the
number of workers) such that these two elasticities are equal). As is visible at
the bottom of Tables 2.5-2.8, we do not verify alignment systematically. This
said, some of our results are synonymous with alignment.
First, it is the case of our LP-ACF estimates (Table 2.9) as the hypothesis
that γˆ = σˆ is accepted with a probability of, respectively, 0.41 and 0.78. The
main econometric challenge is probably to come up with a robust estimation
of the production function (and thus of what happens along this isoquant as
captured by estimated σ). The estimation of the labour cost function is not
trivial but intrinsically less complicated, at it is less prone to biases (in partic-
ular to short-run endogeneity/simultaneity biases). Hence, it probably not by
chance that we get the alignment with LP, and even more with ACF as these
are methods that have been designed to overcome the limitations of OLS or
fixed-effect methods.
Second, if we consider our industry-by-industry estimates (Figure 2.3), they
are not aligned on a one-by-one case, but are strongly and significantly cor-
related. Thus, statistically, an industry by a lower/higher σ is very likely to
have a lower/higher γ. The absence of a perfect alignment could reflect data
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or estimation limitations (particularly of σ as suggested above), or could point
at a functioning of firms/industries that is synonymous with (partial) short-
sightedness and/or taˆtonnement.
Third, also in Table 2.2, one should note that industry-by-industry estimated
σ and γ have a very similar predictive capacity as to the share of part-time
work and the duration of work. In other words, industries with lower/higher σ
tend to be those with lower/higher γ but also lower/higher share of part-time
worker or higher/lower duration of work.
2.6 Further evidence about quasi-fixed labour
costs
2.6.1 Econometric analysis of worker-level wage data to
estimate labour costs
In this section, we use PIAAC 2012 data34 on average gross wage per hour
(GWH) and hours of work per week (H) from the individuals who work as
employees in the private, for-profit segment of the economy. By definition,
PIAAC aims at delivering comparable international data. It is analysed here
with the aim of assessing how Belgian quasi-fixed labour costs compare with
the situation in other countries. PIAAC contains only individual-level data
so there is no way one can replicate the productivity & labour cost analysis
of the previous sections. And as in the above sections, the objective is to
infer the presence (and the importance) of quasi-fixed labour costs F from the
parameters of an econometric models regressing labour cost on hours.
As in Section 2.5.1 we assume that GWH(H) = (wH + F )/H = w + F/H.
We do not observe unit wage w or fixed labour cost F . But elasticities can be
retrieved by the estimation of a linear35 approximation of the log of GWH(H)
i.e.:
gwhik ≡ Ak + φkhik + λkFik + νik (2.22)
where gwhik is the (log of) the average gross wage per hour reported by
34The OECD led Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
(PIAAC).
35The estimation was conducted using quadratic and cubic approximations. Results were
qualitatively similar to that reported hereafter.
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worker i in country k and hik the (log) of number of hours per week the worker
declares. Assuming the actual process generating wages is GWH = w+ F/H;
[ignoring individual and country indices] we have that
∂ghw
∂h
=
∂ln(GHW )
∂ln(H)
=
− FH2 + w′(H)
F
H2 +
w(H)
H
≈ φ (2.23)
which is negative (i.e. gross wage per hour goes down with hours) if F > 0
and if w′(H) is relatively small or null. In the particular case where w′(H) ≈ 0
[i.e. no or little rise of the wage rate with hours] it is immediate to show that
∂gwh/∂h = F/(F +wH) ≈ φ. This means that the estimation of 2.22 delivers
coefficients that can be used to estimate the share of quasi-fixed labour costs.
Indeed, — φ is a lower bound proxy of the importance of quasi-fixed costs.
Of course, the level of hourly gross wage of an individual worker reflects many
things that have little to do with the number of working hours. As PIAAC is not
a panel, there is no way to resort to fixed effects (FE) to account for unobserved
heterogeneity. What we do is to specify pik as a vector of controls comprising
many of the determinants of wage: educational attainment, gender, labour
market experience, labour market experience squared, occupation (ISCO 2008
2-digit), and industry (ISIC 2-digit). We also include the respondent’s average
test score in literacy, numeracy, and problem solving. The hope is that this
rather rich set of controls allows for a proper identification of actual gross
wage/hours elasticity φ, and thus of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed
labour costs.
Results (Appendix, Table 2.12) clearly hint at the presence of quasi-fixed
labour costs. With an estimated φ = −0.18 for Belgium, we may conclude that
fixed costs are at least equal to 18 per cent of total gross wage of a typical
private- and for-profit economy employee. This is slightly below the 20–23
per cent that we found using firm-level data. But remember that PIAAC
is only about gross wages, whereas Bel-first, firm-level data used in previous
section is about total payroll cost, with the possibility that some of elements
constituting the difference (e.g. severance payments, in-kinds) drive fixed costs’
share upwards.
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2.6.2 International descriptive/accounting evidence about
the share of quasi-fixed labour cost, and their im-
pact on the demand for hours
Another assessment of our econometric estimates of the share of quasi-fixed
labour costs coming from the comparison with direct estimates of that share,
based on accounting/descriptive data from other countries than Belgium. In
general, authors consider both ‘one-time’ fixed costs (i.e. recruitment, training,
severance) and ‘recurrent’ fixed labour costs i.e. employer-funded unemploy-
ment, medical insurance or retirement plans (social security), remuneration of
non-worked days (annual holiday, sick or maternity leave), and other in-kind
employee benefits (stocks, cars, phones).
Hart (1984) suggests that for both the United States and the United Kingdom
it is reasonable to put quasi-fixed labour costs at roughly 20 per cent of total
cost. For Ehrenberg (2016), the [US] data suggest that around 19 per cent of
total compensation (about 60 per cent of nonwage costs) is quasi fixed. Martins
(2004), in a study for Portugal, estimates quasi-fixed costs at 25 per cent of
labour costs, with social security payments being the dominant quasi-fixed cost
item. Of course, the actual sources of quasi-fixed costs in the above countries
could differ from those underpinning the Belgian result. For instance, health
care insurance contributions by firms seem to be a key source of ‘fixity’ in
the US. Less so in Belgium, where severance payments, assimilated days or
in-kinds/perks probably play a greater role. Yet, it is still worth underlying
that the overall estimates published by these authors is surprisingly close to
our estimate for Belgium, at about 20 per cent.
Finally, there is a small literature that used descriptive estimates of quasi-
fixed labour costs as predictor of firms’ demand for hours (paralleling what we
do in Section 2.5.2). Cutler and Madrian (1998) find that increases in health
insurance costs during the 1980s increased the hours worked by covered work-
ers. Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993) and Buchmueller (1999) show that a
smaller proportion of hours are worked by part-time employees in firms offer-
ing more generous fringe benefits to full-time workers. Finally, Dolfin (2006)
uses US data on the cost of recruiting, search, hiring, training, and firing; and
shows that, ceteris paribus, the higher that cost the higher the average number
of hours. The results of these studies are consistent with our results in Sec-
tion 2.5.2. based on inferred/econometric measures of quasi-fixed labour costs.
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More generally, they accord with the idea of substitution of hours for workers
in response to rising quasi-fixed labour costs, as predicted by a theory of labour
demand.
2.7 Concluding remarks
Hours worked tend to not only vary across individuals but also — on aver-
age — across firms, and even within firm over time. Why? Over the past
decades, most economists have privileged the idea that shorter versus longer
hours (leaving labour market regulations aside) had primarily to do with the
preferences of individuals. In this work, echoing Pencavel (2016)’s question of
‘Whose Preferences Are Revealed in Hours of Works?’, we explore the role of
employers’ preferences for working time; and in particular the role of quasi-
fixed labour costs. By quasi-fixed labour costs, we mean any expense that
is assoc ated with employing a worker but is independent of his/her hours of
work (such as the costs of in-kind benefits, hiring and training new workers,
firing workers,36 taxes, or insurance payments that are not proportional to the
duration of work).
We consider a setup where firms decide simultaneously on working hours
and the number of workers. We find that despite an obvious productivity gain
from reducing working hours, firms facing large quasi-fixed labour costs choose
a higher level of hours to cover such quasi-fixed labour costs.
We estimate that increasing hours by 1 per cent would only increase output
(value added) by 0.8 per cent, thus in line with the hypothesis of decreasing
marginal return to working hours, and that of imperfect substitutability be-
tween hours and workers in the production process. What is more — and to
our knowledge this is a novelty — we were able to retrieve the relative share of
quasi-fixed labour costs: 20–23 per cent of a worker’s cost could be independent
from hours. These econometric results suggest that the typical for-profit firm
located in Belgium faces financial incentives to raise hours beyond the point
where the average labour productivity starts declining. These explain why ce-
teris paribus some industries (i.e. those with higher quasi-fixed labour costs)
are characterized by longer hours and a lower propensity to employ people on
a part-time basis. We also find evidence that quasi-fixed labour costs are more
36Recruitment, training or firing costs typically intervene as fixed labour costs pro rata
firms’ turnover rate.
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important among people with a full-time contract than among those with a
part-time or interim contract. Again, this could explain employers’ reluctance
to let the former reduce their working hours, even when they accept a strictly
proportional reduction of their wage.37
In short, when it comes to working time policies — often presented as crucial
to accommodate the varying needs and desires of contemporary individuals —
policymakers should not overlook firms’ preferences and their determinants.
For instance, in the context of pension reforms aimed at extending people’s ca-
reers, they should check that the quasi-fixed costs of employing older workers
are limited. If not, employers might be reluctant to endorse part-time/flexitime
work arrangements most older individuals aspire to (Harris Interactive & Dy-
chtwald, 2005).
37And do not demand that the hourly wage gets revised upwards to preserve total remu-
neration.
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Table 2.11: Estimation of elasticities, by industry (NACE 3)
NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
101 Processing and preserving of meat
and production of meat products
864 0,65 0,0000 0,44 0,0000
103 Processing and preserving of fruit
and vegetables
330 1,03 0,0000 1,08 0,0000
105 Manufacture of dairy products 261 0,52 0,0000 0,76 0,0000
106 Manufacture of grain mill prod-
ucts, starches and starch products
135 0,85 0,0000 0,92 0,1221
108 Manufacture of other food prod-
ucts
916 0,95 0,0000 0,74 0,0000
109 Manufacture of prepared animal
feeds
211 0,48 0,0000 0,89 0,4920
110 Manufacture of beverages 357 0,71 0,0000 0,82 0,0000
120 Manufacture of tobacco products 79 0,91 0,0000 0,47 0,0001
131 Preparation and spinning of tex-
tile fibres
207 0,87 0,0000 1,00 0,8482
132 Weaving of textiles 257 0,66 0,0000 0,70 0,0000
139 Manufacture of other textiles 544 0,82 0,0000 0,73 0,0000
141 Manufacture of wearing apparel,
except fur apparel
312 0,92 0,0000 0,91 0,0000
161 Sawmilling and planing of wood 189 0,73 0,0000 0,53 0,0000
162 Manufacture of products of wood,
cork, straw and plaiting materials
566 0,83 0,0000 0,80 0,0000
171 Manufacture of pulp, paper and
paperboard
193 0,95 0,0080 0,83 0,0000
172 Manufacture of articles of paper
and paperboard
394 0,88 0,0000 0,90 0,0000
181 Printing and service activities re-
lated to printing
986 0,82 0,0000 0,64 0,0000
201 Manufacture of basic chemicals,
fertilisers and nitrogen compounds,
plastics and synthetic rubber in pri-
mary forms
821 0,73 0,0000 0,65 0,0000
0,55 0,0000
204 Manufacture of soap and deter-
gents, cleaning and polishing prepara-
tions, perfumes and toilet preparations
195 0,90 0,0000 0,66 0,0000
205 Manufacture of other chemical
products
345 0,58 0,0000 0,61 0,0000
211 Manufacture of basic pharmaceu-
tical products
72 0,82 0,0000 1,43 0,0000
212 Manufacture of pharmaceutical
preparations
294 0,61 0,0000 0,75 0,0000
222 Manufacture of plastics products 1169 0,85 0,0000 0,81 0,0000
86
2.7 Concluding remarks
NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
233 Manufacture of clay building ma-
terials
105 0,86 0,0000 0,74 0,0041
236 Manufacture of articles of con-
crete, cement and plaster
853 0,74 0,0000 0,65 0,0000
0,43 0,0000
241 Manufacture of basic iron and
steel and of ferro-alloys
212 0,77 0,0000 0,84 0,0036
244 Manufacture of basic precious and
other non-ferrous metals
225 0,90 0,1087 0,56 0,0000
245 Casting of metals 235 0,57 0,0000 1,12 0,0004
251 Manufacture of structural metal
products
1352 0,51 0,0000 0,63 0,0000
252 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs
and containers of metal
192 0,92 0,0000 0,87 0,0000
255 Forging, pressing, stamping and
roll-forming of metal; powder metal-
lurgy
207 0,68 0,0000 0,99 0,4761
256 Treatment and coating of metals;
machining
1007 0,84 0,0000 0,68 0,0000
257 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and
general hardware
121 0,67 0,0000 0,83 0,0545
259 Manufacture of other fabricated
metal products
714 0,43 0,0000 0,41 0,0000
261 Manufacture of electronic compo-
nents and boards
162 0,66 0,0000 0,89 0,3448
262 Manufacture of computers and pe-
ripheral equipment
44 0,77 0,0083 0,90 0,8064
263 Manufacture of communication
equipment
137 0,82 0,0570 1,00 0,9506
265 Manufacture of instruments and
appliances for measuring, testing and
navigation; watches and clocks
178 0,72 0,0000 0,78 0,0000
271 Manufacture of electric motors,
generators, transformers and electri-
cidistribution and control apparatus
232 0,93 0,0000 1,07 0,0000
0,53 0,0093
279 Manufacture of other electrical
equipment
139 0,63 0,0000 1,17 0,0000
281 Manufacture of general – purpose
machinery
268 0,91 0,0000 0,93 0,0236
282 Manufacture of other general-
purpose machinery
736 0,72 0,0000 0,72 0,0000
283 Manufacture of agricultural and
forestry machinery
152 0,88 0,0000 0,93 0,4027
289 Manufacture of other special-
purpose machinery
430 0,92 0,0000 1,19 0,0000
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NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
291 Manufacture of motor vehicles 90 0,61 0,0550 0,69 0,0475
293 Manufacture of parts and acces-
sories for motor vehicles
332 0,61 0,0000 0,68 0,0000
321 Manufacture of jewellery, bi-
jouterie and related articles
71 0,70 0,0000 0,49 0,0000
325 Manufacture of medical and dental
instruments and supplies
334 0,60 0,0000 0,41 0,0000
331 Repair of fabricated metal prod-
ucts, machinery and equipment
391 0,84 0,0000 0,92 0,0000
332 Installation of industrial machin-
ery and equipment
172 0,90 0,0000 0,76 0,0000
370 Sewerage 95 0,88 0,0000 0,81 0,0000
381 Waste collection 106 0,81 0,0000 0,70 0,0000
382 Waste treatment and disposal 310 0,76 0,0000 0,55 0,0000
0,62 0,0000
411 Development of building projects 205 0,71 0,0000 0,51 0,0000
412 Construction of residential and
non-residential buildings
3368 0,80 0,0000 0,72 0,0000
421 Construction of roads and railways 1127 0,88 0,0000 0,90 0,0000
422 Construction of utility projects 645 0,84 0,0000 1,05 0,0000
429 Construction of other civil engi-
neering projects
196 0,77 0,0000 1,16 0,0554
431 Demolition and site preparation 566 0,84 0,0000 0,75 0,0000
432 Electrical, plumbing and other
construction installation activities
2580 0,68 0,0000 0,61 0,0000
433 Building completion and finishing 2232 0,68 0,0000 0,54 0,0000
439 Other specialised construction ac-
tivities
1252 0,56 0,0000 0,56 0,0000
0,56 0,0000
452 Maintenance and repair of motor
vehicles
659 0,57 0,0000 0,54 0,0000
453 Sale of motor vehicle parts and ac-
cessories
581 0,70 0,0000 0,55 0,0000
461 Wholesale on a fee or contract ba-
sis
359 0,90 0,0000 0,71 0,0000
462 Wholesale of agricultural raw ma-
terials and live animals
392 0,59 0,0000 0,53 0,0000
463 Wholesale of food, beverages and
tobacco
2314 0,55 0,0000 0,47 0,0000
465 Wholesale of information and
communication equipment
519 0,76 0,0000 0,45 0,0000
466 Wholesale of other machinery,
equipment and supplies
2996 0,81 0,0000 0,68 0,0000
467 Other specialised wholesale 3004 0,70 0,0000 0,80 0,0000
469 Non-specialised wholesale trade 328 0,76 0,0000 0,68 0,0000
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NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
471 Retail sale in non-specialised
stores
2442 0,69 0,0000 0,77 0,0000
472 Retail sale of food, beverages and
tobacco in specialised stores
641 0,80 0,0000 0,60 0,0000
474 Retail sale of information and
communication equipment in spe-
cialised stores
255 0,85 0,0000 0,45 0,0000
475 Retail sale of other household
equipment in specialised stores
1571 0,83 0,0000 0,61 0,0000
476 Retail sale of cultural and recre-
ation goods in specialised stores
254 0,62 0,0000 0,69 0,0000
477 Retail sale of other goods in spe-
cialised stores
2339 0,93 0,0000 0,74 0,0000
494 Freight transport by road and re-
moval services
3955 0,44 0,0000 0,41 0,0000
521 Warehousing and storage 966 0,82 0,0000 0,93 0,0000
551 Hotels and similar accommodation 1262 0,84 0,0000 0,79 0,0000
552 Holiday and other short-stay ac-
commodation
73 0,94 0,0000 0,66 0,0000
561 Restaurants and mobile food ser-
vice activities
2401 0,76 0,0000 0,70 0,0000
562 Event catering and other food ser-
vice activities
531 0,79 0,0000 0,86 0,0000
591 Motion picture, video and televi-
sion programme activities
318 0,42 0,0000 0,87 0,0000
602 Television programming and
broadcasting activities
72 1,02 0,2280 1,38 0,0825
612 Wireless telecommunications ac-
tivities
153 1,09 0,0000 0,75 0,0000
620 Computer programming, consul-
tancy and related activities
2317 0,75 0,0000 0,74 0,0000
631 Data processing, hosting and re-
lated activities; web portals
156 0,65 0,0000 1,05 0,0271
642 Activities of holding companies 609 0,65 0,0000 0,80 0,0000
661 Activities auxiliary to financial
services, except insurance and pension
funding
700 0,69 0,0000 0,72 0,0000
662 Activities auxiliary to insurance
and pension funding
293 0,54 0,0000 0,47 0,0000
682 Renting and operating of own or
leased real estate
633 0,80 0,0000 0,77 0,0000
683 Real estate activities on a fee or
contract basis
158 0,97 0,0000 0,70 0,0000
691 Legal activities 334 0,57 0,0000 0,46 0,0000
692 Accounting, bookkeeping and au-
diting activities; tax consultancy
342 0,90 0,0000 0,91 0,0000
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NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
701 Activities of head offices 528 0,68 0,0000 0,42 0,0000
702 Management consultancy activi-
ties
996 0,80 0,0000 0,89 0,0000
711 Architectural and engineering ac-
tivities and related technical consul-
tancy
1096 0,89 0,0000 0,78 0,0000
0,55 0,0000
731 Advertising 575 0,75 0,0000 0,82 0,0000
732 Market research and public opin-
ion polling
271 0,80 0,0000 0,55 0,0000
741 Specialised design activities 79 1,12 0,0000 1,00 0,9483
743 Translation and interpretation ac-
tivities
52 1,24 0,0004 0,95 0,4670
749 Other professional, scientific and
technical activities n.e.c.
53 0,79 0,0695 0,47 0,0480
771 Renting and leasing of motor vehi-
cles
210 0,56 0,0000 0,45 0,0000
772 Renting and leasing of personal
and household goods
98 0,85 0,0000 0,56 0,0000
773 Renting and leasing of other ma-
chinery, equipment and tangible goods
323 0,81 0,0000 0,61 0,0000
781 Activities of employment place-
ment agencies
403 0,58 0,0000 0,56 0,0000
782 Temporary employment agency
activities
713 0,59 0,0000 0,58 0,0000
783 Other human resources provision 110 0,46 0,0000 1,11 0,0003
791 Travel agency and tour operator
activities
268 0,85 0,0000 0,47 0,0000
801 Private security activities 267 0,42 0,0000 0,42 0,0000
802 Security systems service activities 67 0,80 0,3075 0,86 0,5561
811 Combined facilities support activ-
ities
119 0,92 0,0000 0,81 0,0000
0,50 0,0000
813 Landscape service activities 248 0,73 0,0000 1,01 0,7703
829 Business support service activities
n.e.c.
713 0,96 0,0036 0,62 0,0000
0,73 0,0000
869 Other human health activities 334 1,00 0,8865 0,54 0,0000
0,74 0,0000
872 Residential care activities for men-
tal retardation, mental health and sub-
stance abuse
77 0,89 0,0000 1,16 0,3031
873 Residential care activities for the
elderly and disabled
2150 0,55 0,0000 0,41 0,0000
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NACE 3-digit Nobs γj
Prob
γj = 1
σj
Prob
σj = 1
889 Other social work activities with-
out accommodation
388 1,00 0,9982 1,05 0,0000
931 Sports activities 334 0,95 0,0000 0,66 0,0000
932 Amusement and recreation activi-
ties
188 0,83 0,0000 0,94 0,0003
952 Repair of personal and household
goods
98 1,23 0,0000 0,66 0,0000
960 Other personal service activities 979 0,68 0,0000 0,64
0,0000
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Table 2.12: Econometric Results-Worker-level (cross-sectional) analysis. Con-
ditional impact of (log of) hours on (log of) average hourly gross
wage (computed as the ratio [weekly] gross wage/hours). Belgium
(Flanders)
BEL
h -0.180***
(0.024)
Experience 0.027***
(0.002)
Experience2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Schooling years 0.034***
(0.004)
Score (log of)$ 0.179**
(0.059)
Female -0.095***
(0.020)
Other controls
Occup (ISCO 2008 2-digit) indus(ISIC
2-digit) fixed effects
Estimates of the wage/hours elasticity
∂gwh/∂h = −F/(F + wH) ≈ φ if W ′(H) = 0 -0.180***
Prob φ = 0 0.000
Source: PIAAC-OECD 2012
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
$ The respondent’s average test score in literacy, numeracy and problem solving.
92
Chapter 3
Effort optimal reaction to
firing threat in a fair-wage
model
Co-authored with Mathias Hungerbu¨hler
The empirical literature has documented that in the presence of a
firing threat, workers tend to undertake more effort in their job.
However, the theoretical literature on effort lacks a framework that
takes this feature into account, as a basic fair wage model would
predict that during bad times, if wages fall down, effort will follow in
the same direction. We develop a model where workers internalize
the impact of their individual effort on the risk of being dismissed
during bad times. We implement this mechanism within a sim-
ple general equilibrium model with efficiency wages and show that
workers optimally increase their effort level following a negative
shock. This result could help understand previously documented
evidences of productive recessions.
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3.1 Introduction
The recent recessions of 2008 and 2012 have caused a sharp increase in the un-
employment rate in most developed countries. Many countries are still affected
by high levels of unemployment, along with an otherwise recovering economy.
The joblessness of the recovery has been attributed, at least partially, to an
increase in individual productivity. Evidences on jobless recoveries as episodes
that tend to display a relatively higher productivity level than other, stan-
dard, recoveries have been presented by Berger (2012) and Burger & Schwartz
(2015) among others. It is however not clear what drives the increase in pro-
ductivity: in Berger, firms fire the less productive workers, whereas in Burger
& Schwartz, less productive firms or sectors shut down. Another possibility is
that workers undertake a greater effort: evidence of this at the firm level is pre-
sented by Lazear (2016). In previous work, we also documented macroeconomic
evidences of an increase in individual hours of work during jobless recoveries
(Delmez (2019)). In fact, when productivity is measured per worker, additional
individual hours will contribute to an increase in the measured productivity.
For all of what follows, we interpret effort as anything that increases the mea-
sured productivity per worker, without increasing its contractual wage (for
example unpaid overtime hours, education, more focus, less on-the-job leisure,
. . . ). In the past, effort has usually been included in general equilibrium models
through the mechanism of efficiency (or fair) wage, which implies that workers
offered wages above their outside option will reciprocate with a more intense
effort. With this baseline mechanism, we should observe that the effort level
declines during bad times (or stays stable due to downward wage rigidity). In
this paper, we argue that the baseline efficiency wage model should be supple-
mented to accomodate for an increase in individual effort and productivity in
the absence of an increase in wages, as has been documented in the literature
and summarized above. To understand what sorts of mechanism might be at
play, we summarize below the main findings on the drivers of individual effort
for a given wage level.
Previous research highlighted the contribution of different factors to changes
in the effort provided by workers for a given wage level. In particular, a drop in
income (Anderson & Frantz (1984)) and unexpected events in general (Abeler
et al. (2011)) as well as rewards (Goswami & Urminsky (2017)) and higher
relative wages in an unequal wage structure (Pfeifer (2010)) tend to increase
effort for a given hourly wage. Similarly, a higher minimum wage (Brandts &
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Charness (2004)) and a high income target (Abeler et al. (2011)) also tend to
increase effort at a given wage level. Finally, Lazear (2016) and Corgnet et al.
(2015) present empirical evidences on the importance of firing threat to explain
the observed hike in individual effort. In particular, Lazear observes within a
large firm that effort varies over the business cycle, with an increase of around
5% during the recession, of which at least 85% is attributable to an increase
in individual effort, the remaining being due to a change in composition of the
workforce at the firm level. In the context of economic recessions, firing threats
appear as a strong potential candidate to explain a rise in effort and will be
the focus of our contribution.
The firing threat is not unknown in the litterature. It has been largely
studied empirically by researchers from different fields: economics, management
but also psychology. As mentioned above, Corgnet et al. (2015) find, in a
virtual workplace experiment, that firing threats decrease shirking and increase
production and that this effect disapears with the removal of the threat. In
particular, they show that in the presence of a firing threat, individual of all
ability levels wish to signal themselves as non-shirking workers. This outcome
is corroborated by Kopanyi-Peuker, Offerman & Sloof (2018) who also find that
when the employer can fire a worker, even with a cost, the worker’s productivity
rises. Their result is robust to the introduction of noise between effort and
productivity. One important finding is that the firm has to be able to commit
to retain some workers, that is it cannot strategically fire all its workers in each
period in the hope a a higher productivity. In fact, in recent work, Kuvalekar
& Lipnowski (2018) find that job insecurity leads to lower effort when the
commitment of the firm is not credible. Finally, Brandts et al. (2018) have
pointed out that hours of work can be used as a proxy by employer to evaluate
effort, with the same positive effect on productivity in presence of firing threat.
In this last case, the firing threat will lead to an increase in individual hours.
The macroeconomic consequences of the firing threat have however, to our
knowledge, not yet been modelled in a fair-wage setting, which is the usually
standard method of introducing effort in the production function1. We develop
a fair-wage model where workers internalize the effect of their effort level on
their probability to be fired. Our model is aimed at describing the macroe-
conomic consequences, in terms of employment, wages and output level, of a
1The closest experiment is the work by Golosov & Menzio (2015) who use strategic firing
threat to generate effort in a search-and-match context. They find that the resulting variation
in workers’ effort is able to give rise to business cycle fluctuations.
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temporary shock to aggregate productivity. In particular, we will assume for
simplicity that there are no matching frictions. This hypothesis is singularly
less strong in a recession context where the pool of unemployed is so large that
firms can immediately find a new worker if they wish to hire (in line with the
findings of Michailliat (2012))2. The model is thus fairly simple and the main
steps follow. In the beginning of each period, workers previously hired, firms
and job-seekers observe the shock. At that point, firms set the wage (unilat-
erally but anticipating the workers’ reaction) and, immediately after, workers
decide on their optimal level of effort, based on the wage they were offered and
taking into account that in case of negative shock, the less productive workers
will be fired. At the end of each period, firms decide on the optimal number of
workers for the next period and hire or fire employees to reach that number.
In case of firing, it is the less productive workers who are laid down. This
raises the question of the observation of the individual productivity, here en-
tirely determined by individual effort. In our case, given the homogenity of the
workers, they will all turn up to accomplish the same level of effort and the
firm therefore simply randomizes the firing decision.
Altough the model appears to be extremly simple, the new mechanism of
fear of firing introduce several technical complexities. First, the mutliple in-
terdependances between aggregate productivity, wages, effort and employment
trigger non-linearities that hamper explicit solutions. In particular, the optimal
effort is now a compound reaction to both the wage level and the probability
to be fired, which itself depends on the state of the world (good or bad shock).
Furthermore, in case of positive aggregate shock, no one gets fired and the effort
decision can be reduced to the simple fair wage case. On the contrary, when the
aggregate shock is negative, workers anticipate firing at the end of the period
and effort thus optimally increases at any given wage level. This askew reac-
tion of workers to aggregate shocks generates a kink around the steady state
for the optimal effort, which results in asymmetries around the steady state.
The non-linearities issued from the multiple interdependances combined to the
instrinsic assymetry of effort generates substantial mathematical complexity to
simulate the model. To our knowledge, no previous model allows to take into
account business cycle variations with non-linear and non-symmetric reactions
of agents. In this project, we present different potential solution methods and
discuss them.
2Future work should include matching frictions to be able to extend the conclusions to a
broader set of economic scenarii.
96
3.1 Introduction
Beyond supplying a theoretical fair wage framework that supports the em-
pirical evidences on individual hours of work at the worker and firm level, this
research contributes to previous macroeconomic findings regarding the inclu-
sion of both an extensive and an intensive margin of labour. In particular,
seminal work in this field has been performed by Rogerson and co-authors
who present a basic framework for policy analysis with search frictions in sin-
gle worker firms (Fang & Rogerson (2009)). They show how the inclusions
of both an intensive and an extensive margin can reconcile micro and macro
labour supply elasticity estimates (Keane & Rogerson (2012)) and how these
elasticities play an important role in the presence of taxes (Rogerson & Wal-
lenius (2009)). Chetty et al. (2011) also revisit evidences on micro and macro
elasticities in a framework with both an intensive and an extensive margin. Fi-
nally, Dominguez et al. (2011) also developed a basic framework for individual
hours of work where a decrease in working time increases the employment rate
through an increasing participation rate, at a fixed wage rate.
Section 3.2 lays down the model and calibration choices. Thereafter, section
3.3 discusses the methods used to present simulations of the model. Section
3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Timing
At the beginning of each period t, the aggreagate productivity level A is re-
vealed to all agents: workers and job-seekers maximizing their utility level and
identical, profit-maximizing firms. Workers and job-seekers are perfectly ho-
mogenous and only differ by their employment status. At the outset, firms set
the wage rate, anticipating the reaction of effort. As is the case in usual fair
wage models, firms set a wage above the (here exogenous) outside options of
workers in order to generate a higher level of effort. Next, workers optimally set
their effort taking into account the wage rate (reciprocity) and the impact of
their effort on the probability to be fired (fear of firing). Job-seekers find a job
with a probability that is independant from their behaviour and therefore they
do not make any specific choice. In fact, participation in the labour market is
not modelled here and all agents are supposed to be active on the labour mar-
ket. Finally firms set the optimal number of workers for the next period (t+ 1)
to maximize their expected profit. This optimal number of workers is imple-
mented through either firing or hiring some workers at the end of the period.
For now, we do not consider any hiring of firing costs or frictions, such that the
firm can perfectly implement its optimal number of workers. Employment is
however predetermined, based on the expectations made for next period, and
in particular firms do not anticipate that a new shock will hit the economy.
This specific timing of the shock, wage setting and then effort setting at the
beginning of the period, followed by the labour setting at the end of the period
is necessary to prevent the model from several caveat. First, if the employment
decision would happen before the effort is set, there would be no room for a
increase in effort to reduce one’s own firing probability. In other words, there
would be no fear of firing, on the contrary: workers would know in advance that
they are fired and should optimally provide zero effort. Labour decision must
thus come after the effort is exerted, thus at the end of the period. Second,
effort is decided before it is accomplished, thus at the beginning of the period.
Third, wage is used to incentivize a higher effort since we have a reciprocity
dimension, therefore, wage has to be set before effort. Otherwise, wage could
always be set to the outside option of the worker. To sum up, labour must be
set after effort is exerted, thus at the end of the period and wage has to be set
before effort.
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3.2.2 Workers
In our model, all agents are active labour market participants, either working
or unemployed. The worker derives utility (Ut) from his wage (wt), diminished
by the cost of his effort (c(et) =
e2
2 ). He also enjoys utility from reciprocity
in the labour relation: he happily provides a higher effort if the difference
between his wage level (wt) and his outside option (b, exogenous) is large.
This outside option is equal to the income he perceives when unemployed,
in our case derived from home production as there is no formal governement
providing benefits. The (discounted) continuation value of the worker depends
on whether he remains employed (with probability (1 − δt(e))) or gets fired
(with probability δt(e)) at the end of the period. The probability to be fired
decreases with the level of effort he provides.
Ut = wt − β e
2
t
2
+ θ(wt − b)γet + µ [(1− δt(et))Ut+1 + δt(et)Bt+1] (3.1)
The worker’s optimization problem is simply to determine his effort level.
Maximizing his utility with respect to effort yields an optimal level of effort that
is implicitely defined in equation 3.2. The explicit form of effort is presented
in the Appendix.
et =
θ
β
(wt − b)γ − µ
β
δ′e(Ut+1 −Bt+1) (3.2)
The optimal level of effort depends on the probability to be fired (δt(e)),
that is defined very simply as the proportion of workers who will be fired at the
end of the period (ft) out of the firm’s current labour force (lt−1) multiplied
by a factor that measures the relative size of the worker’s effort (et) compared
to the average effort (e¯) (equation (3.3)). By definition, the number of fired
workers corresponds to the difference between the current number of workers
(lt) and the optimal number of workers the firm wants to have in the next
period (lt+1). At the optimum, following the absence of worker heterogenity,
they all achieve the same level of effort such that their individual effort is always
equal to the mean effort (e¯ = e∗). We thus have the following probability to
be fired:
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δt =
ft
lt
e¯
et
(3.3)
Where : ft =
{
lt−1 − lt if lt−1 − lt ≥ 0
0 else.
(3.4)
It should be noted from this definition that the number of fired workers
cannot be negative. If the firm grows, the number of fired workers is equal to
zero and the number of hired workers will be positive. This distinction between
firing and hiring, instead of using an aggregate turnover number, is central to
our model’s main mechanism which implies that workers react differently to
positive and negative aggregate shocks. The number of fired workers as a
function of the number of workers is thus kinked at zero, which is also the
steady state value. One can also note that the number of fired workers cannot
be higher that the total number of workers, as the firm cannot choose a negative
optimal number of workers. The minimum number of workers will be zero
(lt = 0), in which case the firms fires all its workers (ft = lt−1). Combined
with the non-negativity of the number of fired workers, this ensures that the
probability to be fired is always comprised between 0 and 1, by construction.
3.2.3 Job-seekers
The unemployed agents derive a utility level denoted B from an income b
that should be understood as home production, in our context without formal
unemployment benefits. The continuation value depends on the probability
that the job-seeker is hired at the end of the period (ξt), to begin working in
the following period. As mentionned above, the job-seeker cannot influence
this probability and there is no participation decision in our model. He thus
does not solve any optimization problem in our model.
Bt = b+ µ [ξtUt+1 + (1− ξt)Bt+1] (3.5)
The probability to be hired at the end of the period (ξt) depends both on
the current number of job-seekers (Vt), in other words the size of the pool of
unemployed, and on the aggregate number of hirings (Ht) to be made by firms
at the end of the period. Individually, each firm hires h workers, downward
bounded at zero. The number of firms (n) is a parameter calibrated to normal-
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ize total employment at 0.95 at the steady state (n ∗ lss = 0.95), out of a total
population of 1. Since there is no participation decision, the number of unem-
ployed workers is simply equal to one minus total employement (Vt = 1 − Lt,
with Lt = n ∗ lt).
ξt =
Ht
Vt
(3.6)
Where : ht =
{
lt − lt−1 if lt − lt−1 ≥ 0
0 else.
(3.7)
Ht = nht (3.8)
3.2.4 Firms
The production is totally standard in a fair wage context. Firms produce using
a combination of labour and effort, decide on the size of their labour force and
set the wage, anticipating their effect on the effort provided by workers. There
is no capital in the model. Aggregate productivity (A) experiences unexpected
shocks A that have a zero mean and a standard deviation of σ, and autocor-
relation over time of A measured by the parameter ρ. Our focus is on negative
productivity shocks.
yt = exp(At)(etlt−1)α (3.9)
Where : At = ρAAt−1 − A (3.10)
Firms observe the shock, then set the wage and choose the optimal number
of workers for next period by maximizing their profit pit with respect to wt
and lt+1. To simplify the reading of the Dynare code in parallel of the model,
we adopted the same timing convention as imposed by the software, namely
that a variable decided in period t is indexed t. In our case, lt is thus the
employment level decided today, that will be productive next period. Hiring
or firing decisions are implicitely made when the firm decides to increase its
labour force compared to the current situation (hiring), or decrease it (firing).
pit = exp(At)(etlt−1)α − wtlt−1 (3.11)
Profit maximization yields, implicitely, the optimum wage level (equation
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3.12) and number of workers (equation 3.14) of the representative firm. The
detail computations for e′w can be found in the appendix.
Wages:
∂pi
∂w
= 0
lt = (exp(At)αe
α−1
t e
′
w)
1
1−α (3.12)
where e′w =
∂e
∂w
=
γθ(wt − b)γ−1
2β
(3.13)
+
[
θ2
2β2
(wt − b)2γ + 2µ
β
ft
lt−1
(Ut+1 −Bt+1)
]−1/2
θ2
β2
γ(wt − b)2γ−1
Employment:
E(pit+1|t) = exp(E(At+1|t)(et+1|tlt+1|t)α − wt+1|tlt
∂E(pit+1|t)
∂lt
= 0
wt+1|t = exp(ρAAt)αeαt+1|tl
α−1
t (3.14)
For what follows, the reader should consider that all variables indexed t+ 1
are taken in expectation, given t. It should be noted that with a more “usual”
timing where employment and wages are decided simultaneously in t, for the
period t, we could easily combine first order conditions (3.14) and (3.12) to get
the following general results: wt =
et
e′w
.
3.2.5 Aggregate outcomes
Since there is perfect homogeneity in firms and in workers and job-seekers,
aggregate outcomes are fairly simple to get. We normalize full employment to
the size of the population (itself normalized to 1) and calibrate the number
of firms n to match a steady state aggregate employment level equal to 95%.
As there is not participation decision in the model, the unemployment level is
simply the size of the population from which we substract total employment.
Aggregate employment: Lt = nlt−1 (3.15)
Aggregate unemployment: Vt = 1− Lt (3.16)
Aggregate production: Yt = nyt (3.17)
102
3.2 Model
3.2.6 Steady state
At the steady state of the model, by definition, employment remains constant
(lt = lt−1). This simplifies greatly the model, as the probability to be either
fired or hired is null. This also implies that we do not need to worry about
satisfying the non-negativity constraints imposed on the number of workers
fired and hired.
Formally, we immediately can write the steady state equations for the number
of workers fired (fss), the probability to be fired (δss), the number of workers
hired at the firm level (hss) and at the aggregate level (Hss) and the probability
for a job-seeker to find a job (ξss).
fss = 0
δss = 0
Hss = 0
ξss = 0
We can then use the above results in the optimal effort, wage and employ-
ment (equations (3.2), (3.12) and (3.14)). We get the following steady state
equations:
ess =
θ
β
(w − b)γ (3.18)
wss =
b
1− γ (3.19)
lss =
(w − b) γ−11−α
e
(exp(A)αγθ)
1
1−α (3.20)
As can be seen immediately, the steady state wage is a function of param-
eters only. It depends positively on the outside option of the worker (b). It
also increases if workers derive a higher utility from the reciprocity between
wages and effort (ie γ is higher). From equation (3.19), we can easily find an
expression for steady state effort and then labour as functions of parameters
only.
Finally, the steady state equations for the utility level of workers (Uss),
of job-seekers (Bss) as well as steady state (aggregate) production and profit
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follow immediately from the previous steady state results. We have:
Uss =
wss − β ess22 + θ(wss − b)γess
1− µ
Bss = b
yss = (esslss)α
piss = (esslss)α − wsslss
Y ss = nyss
Ass = 0
The steady state level of aggregate employment Lss is calibrated to be 0.95,
out of a population of 1. Since there is not participation decision, the steady
state unemployment level V ss is 0.05.
3.2.7 Calibration
We present here the calibration choices made for the parameters of the model.
It should be noted that the parameter that measure the average effort, e¯, is
specific to our model’s mechanism and might raise questions about its calibra-
tion. However, from the homogenity of workers, we can set it to the steady
state value of effort. In fact, the parameter e¯ does not impact the simulation
exercise. Also, as mentionned above, the number of firms is calibrated to reach
a steady state level of aggregate employment (Lss = n ∗ lss) equal to 95% of
the total population. The total population is the sum of workers (L) and job
seekers (V ) and is normalized to 1, such that the levels (of employment or
unemployment) are equal to the rates (of employment or unemployment). Fi-
nally, the outside option of the worker is calibrated to 50% of the steady state
wage. Table 3.1 presents the calibration choices.
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Parameter Value Interpretation
α 2/3
Cobb-Douglas parameter on labour in production
function.
β 1 Share of effort cost in utility function, neutral.
γ 0.3 Reciprocity strength.
θ 0.5 Share of gift exchange in utility function.
µ 0.99 Discount factor
ρA 0.9 Persistence of shock.
σ 0.007/α standard deviation of the exogenous shock.
b 0.6
Replacement wage, represent 50% of wage level at
steady state.
e¯ ess Reference effort set to the effort level at steady state.
n 34.9920 Number of firms, calibrated to get LSS = 0.95
Table 3.1: Parameter calibration value and interpretation
3.3 Simulation exercise and methodological dis-
cussion
The dependance of the firing probability on the effort provided by the worker
generates non-linearities in the optimal effort, wage and employment levels,
that are therefore only implicitely defined by the first order conditions pre-
sented in the previous section. In particular, the impossibility to derive policy
functions prevents us from the possibility to present comparative statics. The
natural way to put forward the output of our model is thus to simulate an
aggregate shock and present the impulse response functions. To simulate our
model, we use the Dynare sofware.
3.3.1 Non-symmetry around the steady state
One of the consequences of the mechanism of fear of firing is that the reaction
of agents is not symmetric around the steady state. In particular, there is no
analogous mechanism to the fear of firing regarding the probability to be hired.
Therefore, we cannot summarize the change in employment using a global
turnover variable that could take negative (net firing) or positive (net hiring)
values. In fact, in the model, we presented two separate variables measuring
respectively the number of workers fired (ft) and the number of workers hired
(ht) and we imposed that each of these variable must always be non-negative.
This non-negativity constraint generates kinks located precisely at the steady
state. Those kinks are illustrated in figure 3.1 below.
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Figure 3.1: Firing and hiring functions
This feature of the model raises challenges for the simulation exercise. In fact,
the standard methodology to generate impulse response functions in models
similar to ours (dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models) in Dynare is
to use the perturbation approach. In this approach, the software approximates
the policy functions around the steady state. The approximation are made
using a technique similar to Taylor expansions and Dynare accomodates com-
putations up to the third order. As in any Taylor expansions, Dynare needs
to compute the first (and second and third for expansion of order two and
three) order derivatives around the steady state. Therefore, the software does
not allow functionnal forms that are not differenciable, such as max or binary
operators. This restriction is in immediate conflict with the non-negativity
constraints imposed on the variables measuring hiring and firing. In fact, this
constraint generates kinks that are obviously non-differentiable. Morevover,
the kink is located precisely at the steady state. Would the kink be located
elsewhere, it would not have represented an issue. In short, it is not possible
to, as would seem natural algebraically, re-write the number of workers fired
as ft = max(0; lt−1 − lt) due to Dynare’s restrictions3.
3Even though it is possible to force Dynare to run with a binary operators worth 1 when
the condition lt−1 − lt ≥ 0 is verified and 0 else, this does not yield interesting results as
Dynare evaluates the operator only one time, that is at the initial values (in our case, the
steady state).
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In what follows, we explore two options to simulate the model given the
constraints. In the first option, we build on our anticipation of the solution.
In particular, we can anticipate if and when the non-negativity constraints will
be binding. In the second option, we change the model to introduce exogenous
turnover at the steady state to ensure both non-negativity constraints are never
hit. In the appendix, we present two additional methods: smoothing the kink
and the use of a deterministic setting.
3.3.2 Anticipating on the solution
We can easily anticipate when and for how long the constraints will be binding.
In fact, our two constraints will always be verified, with equality, at the steady
state where by definition hiring and firing are null. If a negative aggregate shock
hits the economy, firms will always fire workers in the first period, such that
in this initial period, the non-negative firing constraint is not binding, whereas
the non-negative hiring constraint is binding. Then, starting in period 2, and
because the model does not display any frictions, firms will slowly hire until the
economy is back to steady state. We can thus conclude that for period 2 and
all following periods the non-negative hiring constraint is non-binding, whereas
the non-negative firing constraint is binding. This outcome can be exploited to
build an ad-hoc computational solution to simulate the model. The knowledge
we have of the solution, in terms of when the constraints will be binding or
not, is also the reason for not using the RISE toolkit. In fact, RISE is based
on the modelling of the endogenous probabilities to switch from binding to
non-binding states each period, following a markov-switching approach. Those
probabilities to hit constraints are then internalized by the agents. In our case,
we know with certainty when the constraints are hit. Another toolkit exists
to deal with occasionally binding constraints, namely the OccBin toolkit for
Dynare, developed by Guerrieri & Iacoviello in 2015. However, one of the
condition for the proper use of the toolkit is that agents should not be able to
anticipate if and when the constraints will be hit. This is not true in our case.
A summary of the techniques to take care of occasionally binding constraints
(OBC) has been written by Binning & Maih (2017), who also developed the
toolkit RISE.
Based on our anticipation of when the constaints shall be binding or not,
we build an ad-hoc variable (x) worth 1 in period 1, then 0 for all remaining
periods. Thereby, we bypass Dynare’s built-in solution for binary variables.
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The new variable (xt) is the ratio of the random shock (A) over the standard
deviation of the shock (σ). By construction, our new variable is thus worth 1
in period 1, when the shock happens, and 0 for all the remaining periods when
there is no shock4. We append the variables measuring the number of fired
workers, ft and the number of hired workers ht. The new expressions are as
follows:
ft = (lt−1 − lt)xt
ht = (lt − lt−1)(1− xt)
By construction, ft and ht now always satisfy the non-negativity con-
straints. However, this artificial binary variables generates obvious computa-
tion issues within Dynare. Actually, even though the solution is now accepted
by the software, it still generates a discontinuity when the ad-hoc variable x
switches from zero to one and then to zero again. Even though we are able
to generate impulse response functions, there remain issues. In particular, in
the presence of a negative aggregate shock, part of the decrease of the number
of workers at the firm level is correctly attributed to a increase in firing, but
a substantial part of the negative turnover is incorrectly picked up by undue
negative hirings. This generates a negative probability to be hired that dis-
torts most of the results (the impulse response function computed and plotted
by Dynare), with some quantitative non-sense, for example the increase of the
utility level of workers (U) after a negative shock. In fact, when the number
of hirings becomes negative, the probability to be hired also becomes negative.
Then, the continuation value in the utility of the job-seeker (B) is impacted
since we have that, suddenly, a higher future level of utility (Ut+1) negatively
impacts the current utility of job-seekers. In turns, this distorted Bt gener-
ates incoherence in the continutation value of the utility of workers. When
the utility of workers is wrongly defined, the optimal effort that follows utility
maximization is also distorted. Finally the wage level, that anticipates on the
optimal effort also suffers from the initial undue negative hirings. Also, even
though negative shock seems to be able to generate the expected hike in the
effort provided, it is hard to disentangle the effect of our new mechanism from
the effect of fair wage, since we also observe in increase in wage, and from the
distortion induced by the negative hirings. The IRF’s are displayed in Figure
3.2 and the steady state values are given in Table 3.2. It can be noted that
4This follows from the fact that we ask Dynare to simulate a shock worth precisely one
standard deviation.
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starting in period two, the hirings seem to be correctly picked up in the IRF’s
computed by Dynare, whereas the firings suffer from some slight deviation from
zero.
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Figure 3.2: IRF with ad-hoc binary variable
3.3.3 Avoiding the kink altogether
Given the failure of the above mentioned techniques to provide meaningful im-
pulse response functions, a remaining option is to modify the model in order for
the equilibrium to fall in a never-binding case regarding the non-negativity con-
straints. The obvious way to do this is to have a positive equilibrium turnover.
In a model with positive steady state turnover, the number of fired worked and
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Variable Steady-state value
e 0.387298
w 1.2
l 0.0257202
U 127.5
B 60
y 0.0462963
Y 1.71
pi 0.0154321
Table 3.2: Steady state values with ad-hoc binary variable
of hired workers are defined in equations 3.21 and 3.22. A proportion λ of the
work force is fired and hired in each period. This ensures, with λ high enough,
that ft and ht are always positive. The rest of the model remains unchanged.
ft = (1 + λ)lt−1 − lt (3.21)
ht = lt − (1− λ)lt−1 (3.22)
In this context however, the steady state cannot be computed by hand
anymore, due to the fact that hiring and firing probabilities are strictly non-
null at steady state, which is now defined by the equality of the number of
hired and fired workers. The new steady state values of the number of fired
workers (fss), the number of hired workers at the level of the firm (hss) and at
the aggregate level (Hss) and the firing and hiring probabilities (δss and ξss)
are the following:
fss = λlss
hss = λlss
Hss = nλlss
δss = λ
ξss =
nλlss
V ss
We can plug these values in the optimal effort to get the new steady state
level of effort, which is implicitely given by equation 3.23. Using the quadratic
solver and imposing non-negative effort at the steady state, we can get equation
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3.24.
ess =
θ
β
(wss − b)γ + λ
essβ
(Uss −Bss) (3.23)
ess =
θ
β (w
ss − b)γ +
√
( θβ )
2(wss − b)2γ + 4λβ (Uss −Bss)
2
(3.24)
As is immediately observed, the steady state effort now depends not only on
the steady state wage, as before (without equilibrium turnover), but also on
the steady state utility level of workers and job-seekers. The same complexity
appears in the steady state level of all other variables.
In particular, we now have:
e
′ss
w =
γθ(wss − b)γ−1
2β
+
1
2β
[
θ2(wss − b)2γ + 4βµλ(Uss −Bss]−1/2 θ2γ(wss − b)2γ−1
Which allows to compute optimal wages at steady state, implicitely given by:
lss1−α = αessα−1e
′ss
w (3.25)
In turn, optimal labour at steady state is given by the following expression:
lss =
wss
αessα
(3.26)
We can combine equations 3.25 and 3.26 to get the following results (which
is a general results in fair wage models):
wss =
ess
e′ssw
We must then turn to a numerical algorithm to solve the steady state values
of the model. The details are shown in the appendix. Using a calibration of
parameters identical to the one proposed in Table 3.1, except for n which is
now calibrated to 133.516 to keep matching a steady state employment of 0.95.
The resulting steady state values are given in Table 3.3. In particular, we
can see that steady state effort is higher with equilibrium turnover, as was
already visible from the algebra (equations 3.18 and 3.24). The next step
is to implement this steady state in a Dynare simulation of the model with
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equilibrium turnover.
Variable Steady-state value
e 0.56
w 2.3548
l 0.0071
e′w 0.2378
U 233.0426
B 231.222
y 0.0251
Y 3.3556
pi 0.0084
Table 3.3: Steady state values with equilibrium turnover
3.4 Conclusion
Firing threats have been covered by empirical research, leading to the con-
clusion that in the presence of such a threat, wokers tend to carry out more
effort in their work. This effort can be manifested in different manners, for
example working longer hours. Whether this effort is remunerated or not does
not hinder the main consequence of this phenomenon: individual productiv-
ity increases. This increase in individual productivity has been documented
by several authors who studied jobless recoveries such as Berger (2012) and
Burger & Schwartz (2015).
To our knowledge, the fair wage model had not yet been extended to allow
for the fear of firing. In this project, we develop an extension of the fair
wage model where we allow workers to exert a higher effort in order to reduce
their risk of being fired following a negative aggregate shock. Importantly, the
mechanism does not a have counterpart in case of positive aggregate shock.
Therefore, the model does not yield symmetric reaction of agents around the
steady state. We account for this non-symmetry by measuring separately the
number of firings and the number of hirings at each period, instead of using a
net turnover variable taht aggregates firings and hirings.
Beyond the specific mechanism of fear of firing, this project thus looks into
the simulation techniques for models with non-linear and non-symmetric op-
timal reaction of agents to shocks. Beyond the interest in the model itself
to understand the mechanisms behind jobless recoveries, we hope that the
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early stages completed in this research represent an excellent base for techni-
cal developments that could serve a broader agenda of model developments in
macroeconomics and business cycles.
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Appendix
Optimal effort
From the first order condition for optimal effort (equation 3.2) and the defini-
tion of δ (equation 3.3) and f (equation 3.4), we can isolate optimal effort and
take its derivative with respect to wage.
et =
θ
β
(wt − b)γ − µ
β
δ′e(Ut+1 −Bt+1)
δt =
ft
lt
e¯
et
Where : ft =
{
lt−1 − lt if lt−1 − lt ≥ 0
0 else.
We also have that δ′e = − ftlt−1 e¯e2 . First, we plug the expression for δ′e in
optimal effort to get:
et =
θ
β
(wt − b)γ − µ
β
ft
lt−1
1
et
(Ut+1 −Bt+1)
We then solve for e using the quadratic solver and constraining e to be
non-negative:
et =
θ
2β
(wt − b)γ + 1
2
√
(
θ
2β
)2(wt − b)2γ + 4µ
β
ft
lt−1
(Ut+1 −Bt+1)
And finally take the derivative of the optimal effort with respect to wage.
The baseline fair wage case
The objective of this project is to explore how the fear of firing can impact the
economic outcomes (unemployment, production, . . . ) in case of negative shock,
in presence of reciprocity. It is thus informative to understand what happens
in a basic model without the fear of firing. In such a case, the main difference
with the model presented above, is that the probability to be laid off does not
depend on the effort provided by the worker. The model then simplifies greatly
and the impulse response function to a negative aggregate shock are presented
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in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: IRF without fear of firing
As can be seen, following a 1% deviation from the steady state of the aggre-
gate productivity level, we observe that the effort level decreases at the time of
the shock, reciprocating to the decrease in wage at the same period. Total em-
ployment is pre-determined and thus reacts with a lag of one period. In fact, at
the time of the shock the firm cannot immediately adapt its employment level,
such that the shock is entirely absorbed by the wage. Then, starting in the
following period, the firm can pick its optimal employment level. From there
on, the lower aggregate productivity (lower than at steady state) is entirely
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Variable Steady-state value
e 0.232379
w 1.2
l 0.00925926
U 122.7
B 60
y 0.0166667
Y 1.71
pi 0.00555556
Table 3.4: Steady state values without fear of firing
absorbed by employment. This happens because in the presence of reciprocity,
the firm should maintain its wages high to generate a high effort from its work-
ers. The goal of our research is to generate more effort for a given wage reaction
after a negative shock. As can also be seen, this simulation suffers from the
same issues as the one presented in the main section: part of the firing is picked
up by negative hirings, distorting the probabilities to be hired and fired.
If one wants to simplify the model further, we can get rid of the transitions
on the labour market. Then a worker never gets laid off and probabilities to
transition in and out of unemployment are null. In this case, the utility of the
job-seeker is a constant.
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Figure 3.4: IRF without transitions
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Variable Steady-state value
e 0.232379
w 1.2
l 0.00925926
U 122.7
B 60
y 0.0166667
Y 1.71
pi 0.00555556
Table 3.5: Steady state values without transitions on the labour market
Smoothing the function around the steady state
Looking at figure 3.1, the first solution that jumps out is to smooth the func-
tion around the steady state. This can be done using the polyfit tool of Matlab
by providing a grid of points and requiring Matlab to compute the polyno-
mial function that minimizes the distance between the function and the given
coordinates. The method is illustrated in figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Polyfit smoothing
As is imperfectly represented on the picture, the grid of points is centered
around the steady state, on a domain that extends from -10 to +10 percentage
deviation from the steady state. This domain restriction allows to reduce the
size of the remaining numerical error but requires that the simulated value for
the number of fired (respectively hired) workers does not fall outside of the
interval. In our case, the interval covers values from −0.0026 to 0.0026. By
imposing a higher density of points in the grid as we get closer to 0, we give
more weight to the steady state point in the error minimization. The best
polynomial function generated yields a numerical error equal to 0.0001 at the
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steady state.
This numerical error is however still too high with regards to the conse-
quences on the rest of the model. In fact, the error is multiplied to reach a
probability to be fired equal to 0.3% at the steady state, which compromises
the rest of the results.
Using a deterministic setting
The last option considered to simulte the given model is to avoid the need for
differentiable functional forms. In fact, Dynare offers an alternative method
to the perturbation approach. This alternative is most often used in context
deemed “deterministic” and uses a very different technique to generate impulse
response function. In this case, Dynare uses the provided steady state as initial
value and then solves, using different possible algorithm, the model at each
period, until the model converges to the provided end-values, in our case the
steady state. This method circumvent the need for differentiability, each period
being solved independently. However, this does not provide the researcher
with policy functions, but only with a numerical time series for each variable.
Impulse response functions then need to be computed by hand, by simulating
the model many times and aggregating the results to obtain average reactions
after the shock. For reasons yet to be elucidated, we cannot introduce in Dynare
the stochastic variable needed and this research is still ongoing.
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Steady state with equilibrium turnover
The system to be solve is the following, all variables taken at steady state:
e =
θ
β (w − b)γ +
√
( θβ )
2(w − b)2γ + 4λβ (U −B)
2
(A)
e′w =
γθ(w − b)γ−1
2β
+
1
2β
[
θ2(w − b)2γ + 4βµλ(U −B]−1/2 θ2γ(w − b)2γ−1
(B)
U =
w − β e22 + θ(w − b)γe+ µλB
1− µ+ µλ (C)
B =
b+ µ nλl1−nlU
1− µ+ µnλl1−nl
(D)
l1−α = αeα−1e′w (E)
l =
w
αeα
(F)
n =
L
l
(G)
We can combine equations E and F to get the following results (which is a
general results in fair wage models):
wss =
ess
e′ssw
(H)
We can also plug G in D and B (replace n with its calibration value, where
Lss = 0.95). Then, we can plug D in C to get:
U =
w − β e22 + θ(w − b)γe+muλ
[
b+ µλL1−LU
1−µ+ µλL1−L
]
1− µ+ µλ (I)
We then use the fsolve function in Matlab to solve the system of 4 equations
(H, A, B, I) and 4 variables (w, e, e′w and U). The reason for reducing the
dimensionality of the system to only 4 equations is to help fsolve to converge
to a solution.
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